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1725 
SUSPECTS, CARS & POLICE DOGS: A COMPLICATED 
RELATIONSHIP 
Brian R. Gallini* 
Abstract: Officers are searching and arresting vehicle occupants without a warrant with 
increasing regularity. For justification, this Article demonstrates, lower courts across the 
country unconstitutionally expand the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s automobile 
exception—often in the context of a positive dog alert. But Supreme Court jurisprudence 
specifically limits the scope of the automobile exception to warrantless searches of cars and 
their containers. In other words, the probable cause underlying the automobile exception 
allows police to search a vehicle and its containers—nothing more. 
Despite that clear guidance, this Article argues that a growing number of lower courts 
nationwide unconstitutionally rely on the probable cause associated with the automobile 
exception to warrantlessly search vehicle occupants or, alternatively, warrantlessly arrest 
vehicle occupants. Specifically, this Article identifies those courts that interpret the automobile 
exception to additionally authorize two overarching categories of warrantless investigative 
activity: (1) searching vehicle occupants, and (2) arresting vehicle occupants. Each category, 
in the order presented by this Article, progressively unmoors the automobile exception from 
its constitutional foundation by broadly expanding the probable cause standard necessary to 
search a vehicle to permit further warrantless investigation. 
In response, this Article asserts that the probable cause associated with the automobile 
exception is limited to searching cars and does not justify searching people—much less seizing 
people. Those investigative actions, the Article concludes, each require an independent 
exception to the warrant requirement supported by separate probable cause. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The word ‘automobile’ is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth 
Amendment fades away and disappears.1 
 
At 3 a.m. on July 9, 2000, Earmon Alvin Wallace, Sr., was a passenger 
in a four-door Buick sedan traveling at approximately ninety miles per 
hour on a forty mile per hour road.2 Officer Jessica Hertik witnessed the 
vehicle speeding and, additionally, run a red light.3 After stopping and 
approaching the vehicle, she saw a male driver, a male front-seat 
passenger, and three passengers in the back seat—two women and 
Wallace.4 As Officer Hertik wrote two tickets and performed a license 
check, Officer Elizabeth Nelson walked Bosco, her drug detection dog, 
around the car.5 Bosco alerted to the presence of drugs “at the front and 
rear seam of the driver’s side door.”6 Officer Nelson construed Bosco’s 
alert as “a general alert” that applied “to the whole of the passenger 
compartment of the car itself.”7 
Accordingly, and solely based on Bosco’s alert, officers searched all 
five people in the Buick one at a time—first, the driver; then the front seat 
passenger; followed by Wallace; and finally, the other two female 
passengers.8 During the search of Wallace, Officer Supko discovered 
cocaine.9 Officers found no additional contraband on the other occupants’ 
persons.10 Nevertheless, officers decided to search the vehicle and “found 
$1,555 in cash in someone’s shorts in the front passenger seat and a knife 
in a purse in the backseat.”11 They discovered no drugs in the car itself.12 
Wallace was ultimately charged and convicted with possession with the 
 
 * Dean & Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. The author thanks Alex Carroll 
for his invaluable research assistance in preparing this Article alongside his feedback on prior drafts. 
The author also thanks his wife for her support during the writing and editing process, a process that 
included a job change that involved a cross-country move amid a global pandemic with two 
seven-year-olds. Like always, she makes it look easy.   
1. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461–62 (1971).  
2. State v. Wallace, 812 A.2d 291, 294 (Md. 2002). 
3. Id.  
4. Id. 
5. Id.  
6. Id.  
7. Id.  
8. Id. at 294–95. 
9. Id. at 295. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id.  
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intent to distribute cocaine.13 
The officers’ decision to search Wallace—a vehicle occupant—on 
solely the basis of a canine alert during a traffic stop is not atypical.14 To 
the contrary, this Article argues, lower courts across the country have 
unconstitutionally expanded the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s 
automobile exception—often in the context of a positive dog alert. That 
exception permits officers to warrantlessly search a vehicle anywhere they 
have probable cause to believe the vehicle could house the object of 
their search.15 
But Supreme Court jurisprudence specifically limits officers’ authority 
pursuant to the automobile exception to search the car or containers within 
it.16 In other words, the probable cause underlying the automobile 
exception allows police to search a vehicle and its containers—nothing 
more.17 Despite that clear guidance, this Article identifies the growing 
number of lower courts nationwide that have unconstitutionally relied on 
the probable cause associated with a warrantless search of a vehicle 
(pursuant to the automobile exception) to permit a warrantless search of 
the vehicle’s occupants or, alternatively, the warrantless arrest of one or 
more of the vehicle’s occupants.18 
That constitutional problem appears especially acute when the facts 
include drugs—particularly the smell of marijuana—and drug detection 
dogs. The Supreme Court has made clear that a dog alert provides 
probable cause to search a vehicle,19 just as it has made clear that the 
 
13. Id. at 293. As discussed in more detail later, Wallace’s conviction was ultimately reversed on 
appeal. Id. at 302–03. 
14. See, e.g., People v. Neuberger, 2011 IL App (2d) 100379, ¶ 3, 959 N.E.2d 195, 197 (search of 
a vehicle passenger); Morton v. Commonwealth, 232 S.W.3d 566, 567–68 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) 
(search of a vehicle driver); State v. Harris, 280 S.W.3d 832, 837–38 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (search 
of a vehicle driver). 
15. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 
(1991). 
16. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307–08 (Breyer, J., concurring) (clarifying that the scope of the 
automobile exception is limited to a warrantless search of an automobile and its containers and that 
the exception “does not extend to the search of a person found in that automobile”). 
17. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam); California v. Carney, 471 
U.S. 386, 392 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). 
18. Warrantless Search of Vehicle Occupants. See People v. Strong, 574 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1991); State v. Fewell, 184 P.3d 903, 912 (Kan. 2008); State v. Doren, 654 N.W.2d 137, 142 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002); People v. Sostre, 100 N.Y.S.3d 768, 772 (App. Div. 2019). Warrantless 
Arrest of Vehicle Occupants. Blake v. State, 772 So. 2d 1200, 1205–06 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000); 
Brunson v. State, 940 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Ark. 1997); Richard v. State, 7 N.E.3d 347, 349 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2014); Partlow v. State, 24 A.3d 122, 132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011). 
19. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246–47 (2013). 
Gallini (1)  (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2020  5:55 PM 
1728 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1725 
 
automobile exception only applies to vehicles and the containers within.20 
Yet when officers smell marijuana or a drug dog returns a positive alert 
during a routine traffic stop, lower courts problematically view either of 
those factual events as authorizing warrantless searches of the car’s driver 
or its occupants—or both. That approach, however, conflates the probable 
cause standard by relying on the probable cause justifying a vehicle search 
pursuant to the automobile exception to also justify a search that would 
otherwise be governed by another exception to the warrant requirement. 
In sum, although every police investigative action that implicates 
Fourth Amendment protections requires separate and individualized 
probable cause, a growing number of lower courts often hold that probable 
cause to search a car also provides probable cause to conduct other 
investigative activity. That approach both misapplies the probable cause 
standard and deviates from the automobile exception itself. 
Part I explores two separate facets of Supreme Court doctrine: the 
automobile exception and dog alerts. Doing so illustrates an important 
disconnect. That is, despite officers’ frequent reliance on K9 units during 
routine traffic stops, the Supreme Court has never clarified with precision 
what constitutionally permissible investigative activities police may 
undertake following a positive dog alert to a vehicle.21 But in that 
disconnect exists an implicit consistency: The Court has never permitted 
the warrantless search of a person based on probable cause to search 
a vehicle. 
To fully appreciate that disconnect, some calibration is necessary. 
Part II therefore offers a baseline discussion by exploring illustrative 
lower court cases that properly apply the Supreme Court’s automobile 
exception jurisprudence—including when a dog is involved.22 
Part III then identifies the extraordinary number of lower courts that 
 
20. See Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 (2018); Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300; 
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
21. Although a wide array of scholarly literature exists criticizing dog alerts and the automobile 
exception generally, no article has specifically considered the permissible investigative activities the 
police may undertake following a positive dog alert to a vehicle. Critique of dog alerts. See infra 
note 145 and accompanying citations. Critique of the automobile exception. See George M. Dery 
III, Improbable Cause: The Court’s Purposeful Evasion of a Traditional Fourth Amendment 
Protection in Wyoming v. Houghton, 50 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 547 (2000); Robert Angell, Note, 
California v. Acevedo and the Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 707 (1992); Kendra 
Hillman Chilcoat, Note, The Automobile Exception Swallows the Rule: Florida v. White, 90 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 917 (2000); Daniel J. Hewitt, Don’t Accept Rides from Strangers: The Supreme 
Court Hastens the Demise of Passenger Privacy in American Automobiles, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 875 (2000); Joel S. Hjelmaas, Note, The Need for a Higher Standard of Exigency as 
a Prerequisite for Warrantless Vehicle Searches, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1161 (1986).  
22. See State v. Harris, 280 S.W.3d 832, 843 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008); State v. Gibson, 108 P.3d 
424, 429 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005); People v. Juan, 221 Cal. Rptr. 338, 341 (Ct. App. 1985). 
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expansively (and incorrectly) interpret the automobile exception. In doing 
so, Part III argues that those courts interpret the automobile exception, 
including in the context of a dog alert, to additionally authorize two 
overarching categories of investigative activity: (1) the search of a 
vehicle’s occupants,23 and (2) the arrest of a vehicle’s occupants.24 Part III 
contends that each category, in the order presented in this Article, 
progressively unmoors the automobile exception from its constitutional 
foundation by permitting any warrantless investigative activity based only 
on probable cause to search a vehicle pursuant to the 
automobile exception. 
Thus, Part III maintains, the probable cause associated with the 
automobile exception is limited to searching a car and does not justify 
searching a person—much less seizing a person. Both of those 
investigative actions would, as Part III concludes, require separate 
probable cause to justify officers’ reliance on an entirely different 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s search warrant requirement. But 
more on that later. 
I. CARS, DOGS, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”25 The Supreme Court generally views searches 
conducted without a warrant as per se unreasonable.26 Across several 
decades, however, the Supreme Court has recognized numerous “well-
delineated” exceptions.27 For instance, the Court has interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment to permit warrantless searches of automobiles (i.e., 
 
23. See State v. Chambliss, 752 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Turner v. State, 443 
S.E.2d 703, 705 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); People v. Rice, 2019 IL App (3d) 170134, ¶ 19, 125 N.E.3d 
546, 549; State v. Greever, No. 95,303, 2008 WL 5401107, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2008); 
Borkowski v. State, No. 0806, 2017 WL 1435976, at *5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 24, 2017); Small 
v. State, 977 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).  
24. Coley v. State, No. 11,2005, 2005 WL 2679329, at *2 (Del. Oct. 18, 2005) (unpublished table 
decision); Sebastian v. State, 726 N.E.2d 827, 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Baugh, 2016-1201, 
p. 7–8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/18/17); 229 So. 3d 520, 525; State v. Secrist, 589 N.W.2d 387, 394–95 (Wis. 
1999). 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 
(2018). 
26. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19–20 
(1984) (per curiam); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (quoting Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
27. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
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the automobile exception),28 a person incident to arrest,29 a person or 
property pursuant to consent,30 a person during a stop and frisk supported 
by reasonable suspicion,31 and a home in response to exigent 
circumstances,32 among other exceptions.33 
Within that list, the Supreme Court automobile exception jurisprudence 
has evolved considerably since its Prohibition-era inception. In short, the 
automobile exception permits a police officer to warrantlessly search a 
vehicle and the areas within where the officer has probable cause to 
believe contraband or evidence of a crime is located.34 Today, officers rely 
on the automobile exception to access all types of vehicles, including 
ordinary cars,35 mobile homes,36 boats,37 airplanes,38 buses,39 
tractor-trailers,40 and trains.41 Moreover, police rely on the exception to 
justify searching various types of containers inside, including 
 
28. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). 
29. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 
(1969). 
30. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). 
31. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
32. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984). 
33. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155–56 (2004) (border search exception); 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665–66 (1995) (school searches); Mich. Dep’t of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (special needs). 
34. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). 
35. See State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 156 (Iowa 2017); State v. Rocha, 890 N.W.2d 178, 208 
(Neb. 2017); State v. Andersen, 390 P.3d 992, 1000 (Or. 2017). 
36. See United States v. Ervin, 907 F.2d 1534, 1538 (5th Cir. 1990); State v. Otto, 2013 ND 239, 
¶ 16, 840 N.W.2d 589, 594; Powell v. State, 898 S.W.2d 821, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc). 
37. See United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 640–41 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Maybusher, 735 F.2d 366, 372–73 (9th Cir. 1984); Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d 500, 506 (4th Cir. 
1981); United States v. Block, 483 F. Supp. 1296, 1300–01 (D. Mass. 1980).  
38. See United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100, 106–07 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rollins, 699 
F.2d 530, 534 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Broome, No. 1:05-cr-135-WSD, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 10848, at *26–28 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2006). 
39. See Green v. State, 978 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Ark. 1998); State v. Lovely, 365 P.3d 431, 434 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2016); Alvarez v. Commonwealth, 485 S.E.2d 646, 650 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). 
40. See United States v. Smith, 456 F. App’x 200, 208–10 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Navas, 
597 F.3d 492, 500 (2d Cir. 2010). 
41. Symes v. United States, 633 A.2d 51, 55 (D.C. 1993).  
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computers,42 cell phones,43 and luggage.44 
But the scope of the automobile exception is fundamentally limited to 
the search of a vehicle. That limitation correspondingly informs the 
quantum of suspicion necessary for officers to warrantlessly search a 
vehicle—namely, probable cause. Establishing probable cause to search, 
however, is a threshold matter that is independent of whether the 
automobile exception applies. Accordingly, section I.A considers the 
evolution of the automobile exception. Section I.B then considers how 
officers establish the probable cause necessary to support the warrantless 
search of an automobile. In particular, section I.B focuses on the role that 
drug detection dogs play in establishing probable cause. 
A. Automobile Exception 
The so-called “car cases” raise the question of when law enforcement 
may warrantlessly search the passenger compartment of a vehicle, its 
trunk, and/or any containers inside. Commonly referred to as the 
“automobile exception,” the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence related to 
answering that question was, for some time, a genuine mess.45 This 
section, however, does not purport to discuss the numerous Supreme 
Court cases comprising that mess. Rather, it simply provides the Supreme 
Court’s modern approach to the automobile exception. 
The authority for officers to warrantlessly search a vehicle dates back 
to 1925 and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Carroll v. United States.46 In 
Carroll, federal prohibition agents stopped an Oldsmobile Roadster 
driven by George Carroll and John Kiro.47 Suspecting that the pair were 
bootleggers, one of the agents struck the “lazyback” of the vehicle with 
 
42. See State v. Alberts, No. M2015-00248-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 349913, at *7–8 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Jan. 28, 2016). 
43. Some courts exclude cell phones from the reach of the automobile exception. See United States 
v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 941–43 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Mayo, No. 2:13-CR-48, 2013 
WL 5945802, at *9–14 (D. Vt. Nov. 6, 2013); Chung v. State, 475 S.W.3d 378, 386–87 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2014). By contrast, other courts interpret the exception expansively to permit officers to access 
a suspect’s cell phone. See United States v. Zaavedra, No. 12-CR-156-GFK, 2013 WL 6438981, at 
*3 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 9, 2013); United States v. Garcia-Aleman, No. 1:10-CR-29, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 65333, at *12 (E.D. Tex. June 9, 2010); United States v. Fierros-Alavarez, 547 F. Supp. 2d 
1206, 1211–14 (D. Kan. 2008).  
44. See United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 678 F. App’x 232, 233 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. 
Barbee, 968 F.2d 1026, 1030 (10th Cir. 1992); People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Mich. 1992).  
45. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s early 
automobile exception jurisprudence “confused courts and police officers and impeded effective 
law enforcement”).  
46. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
47. Id. at 172.  
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his fist.48 Determining that it was “a great deal harder” than it should be, 
the agent searched the vehicle and discovered whiskey.49 Approving of 
the agent’s warrantless search of the Oldsmobile, the Court held that 
officers may search a vehicle so long as probable cause exists to believe 
the automobile has contraband inside.50 It reasoned that obtaining a 
warrant in the context of an automobile search would be “impossible.”51 
After Carroll, the Supreme Court spent more than six decades 
wrestling with several doctrinal facets of the automobile exception, 
including whether the exception justifies the warrantless search of a 
container found within a vehicle.52 But in 1991, the Court decided 
California v. Acevedo,53 a case of tremendous importance to defining the 
scope of the automobile exception.54 In Acevedo, Jamie Daza picked up a 
Federal Express package that law enforcement knew contained 
marijuana.55 Daza took the package to his apartment, after which time 
Charles Acevedo arrived.56 Acevedo entered Daza’s apartment, stayed for 
a few minutes, and emerged carrying a brown paper bag that appeared full 
to observing officers.57 Acevedo placed the bag in his trunk and began to 
drive away.58 Officers then stopped Acevedo, opened his car’s trunk, and 
found the bag inside, which contained marijuana.59 
 
48. Id. at 174. 
49. Id.  
50. Id. at 155–56. 
51. Id. at 156. Professor Robert C. Post, in his extensive discussion of the Taft Court, notes that the 
Court’s holding in Carroll was chiefly motivated by the absence of then-existing constitutional 
doctrine addressing the automobile. Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the 
American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 
125 (2006). 
52. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1985); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 
487–88 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 
261 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 
(1980); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763–64 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 
13–15 (1977); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 67–69 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 587–88 
(1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 
44 (1970); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 161–62 (1949); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 
694, 700 (1931). 
53. 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
54. See Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing 
Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1403, 1438–41 (2010); Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth Amendment’s 
Principled Protection of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 615 (2008); Angell, supra note 21, at 721. 
55. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 567.  
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The Supreme Court upheld law enforcement’s warrantless search of 
Acevedo’s car and the container within. Justice Blackmun, for the 
majority, wrote: “[W]e now hold that the Fourth Amendment does not 
compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a 
container within the vehicle.”60 Accordingly, he concluded, “the police 
may search without a warrant if their search is supported by probable 
cause.”61 In doing so, the Court admitted that “it is better to adopt one 
clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant 
requirement for closed containers” established under the Court’s prior 
automobile exception precedent.62 
The Court’s effort to further clarify the automobile exception continued 
in 1995 when it decided Wyoming v. Houghton.63 In Houghton, during a 
routine traffic stop, a highway patrol officer noted a hypodermic syringe 
in the driver’s shirt pocket.64 After the driver admitted using the syringe 
to take drugs, the officer engaged in a full search of the automobile’s 
passenger compartment—including a purse containing drug paraphernalia 
that belonged to a passenger.65 Although the Wyoming Supreme Court 
declared the search of a passenger’s bag unconstitutional,66 the Houghton 
majority disagreed. The Court held that when probable cause exists to 
search a vehicle for contraband, officers may warrantlessly search even a 
passenger’s belongings.67 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 
reasoned that, compared to a full search of a passenger, “the degree of 
intrusiveness upon personal privacy and indeed even personal dignity” is 
lower “when the police examine an item of personal property found in 
a car.”68 
Finally, and most recently,69 the Supreme Court in 2018 evaluated the 
 
60. Id. at 576. 
61. Id. at 579. 
62. Id.; see also id. at 576 (“The Chadwick-Sanders rule not only has failed to protect privacy but 
also has confused courts and police officers and impeded effective law enforcement.”). 
63. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).  
64. Id. at 297–98. 
65. Id. at 298. 
66. Id. at 299. The Wyoming Supreme Court held, in part, that: 
[I]f the officer knows or should know that a container is the personal effect of a passenger who 
is not suspected of criminal activity, then the container is outside the scope of the search unless 
someone had the opportunity to conceal the contraband within the personal effect to 
avoid detection. 
Id. (quoting Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 372 (Wyo. 1998)).  
67. Id. at 302. 
68. Id. at 303. 
69. After Houghton, but before Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018), the Court 
decided Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999). In a per curiam opinion, the Dyson Court clarified 
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question of whether the automobile exception permits an officer to 
warrantlessly enter a home’s curtilage in order to search a vehicle.70 In 
Collins v. Virginia,71 an officer located a possibly stolen motorcycle 
parked on the driveway of a house.72 He walked up the driveway and 
pulled off a tarp covering the motorcycle, at which time he confirmed the 
motorcycle was indeed stolen.73 The Court held that the automobile 
exception did not justify the officer’s warrantless search.74 Specifically, 
Justice Sotomayor wrote for a majority of the Court that “the automobile 
exception does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter a home or 
its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein.”75 She reasoned quite 
simply that “the scope of the automobile exception extends no further than 
the automobile itself.”76 
The Court’s modern approach makes clear that police may 
warrantlessly search a car and its contents so long as officers have 
probable cause to do so. But nothing more is permitted. 
B. Dogs and Probable Cause 
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment treatment of drug dogs is, in 
a word, limited. In the Fourth Amendment context, the Court’s discussion 
of dogs focuses on either the impact a dog sniff has on a citizen’s Fourth 
Amendment rights or the role of a dog sniff in establishing probable cause. 
This section follows that organizational framework. 
1. The Fourth Amendment Implications of a Dog Sniff 
Police use of dogs in domestic law enforcement dates back to the early 
1900s, when the Philadelphia Police Department began patrolling with the 
aid of St. Bernard dogs in 1904.77 Then, in 1907, the South Orange, New 
Jersey, police began a patrol dog program.78 From the inception of those 
 
that the automobile exception contains no separate exigency requirement. Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466–
67. 
70. Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1668.  
71. 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018). 
72. Id. at 1668.  
73. Id.  
74. Id. at 1671. 
75. Id. at 1675. 
76. Id. at 1671. 
77. SAMUEL G. CHAPMAN, POLICE DOGS IN NORTH AMERICA 25 (1990). 
78. Id. at 15. This limited discussion focuses solely on domestic use of police detection dogs, 
although dogs began patrolling for police in other countries as early as 1895. Charles F. Sloane, Dogs 
in War, Police Work and on Patrol, 46 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 385, 391 (1955). 
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programs through 1952, just fourteen dog-handler programs existed in 
domestic law enforcement.79 But dogs as a law enforcement investigative 
tool grew in popularity and took a genuine foothold in the 1960s.80 By 
1989, more than 2,000 programs existed across America, with more than 
7,000 police handler dog teams.81 Amidst those programs existed 
considerable diversity in the breed of dog used,82 the law enforcement 
purpose,83 and the type of training the dog received.84 But a preference 
emerged: Law enforcement most commonly came to rely on dogs as a tool 
for drug detection.85 
Despite law enforcement’s increased reliance on dogs as an 
investigative tool across more than seven decades, the Supreme Court did 
not consider the relationship between dogs and the Fourth Amendment 
until 1983. And, once it did, the Supreme Court preliminarily considered 
only whether a dog alert implicated Fourth Amendment protections, 
specifically, whether a dog sniff constitutes a “search.”86 By that time, the 
Court had considered whether a variety of other law enforcement actions 
constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, including: (1) the 
attachment of a listening and recording device to the outside of a public 
 
79. CHAPMAN, supra note 77, at 15.  
80. Id. at 40 (“The 1960s brought a sharp upsurge in the number of canine units implemented by 
American forces. It was almost as if it were a fad to have one . . . .”). 
81. Id. at 27. 
82. Irus Braverman, Passing the Sniff Test: Police Dogs as Surveillance Technology, 61 BUFF. L. 
REV. 81, 141 (2013). 
83. Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the Protection of the 
Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REV. 735, 751 n.54 (2007); War Dog Roles, 
OLIVE-DRAB, http://olive-drab.com/od_wardogs_roles.php [https://perma.cc/8VV3-7F28]; 
Alexandra Horowitz, The Limits of Detection, NEW YORKER (Apr. 24, 2013), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-limits-of-detection [https://perma.cc/C9V4-
XXNV?type=image].  
84. See Jane J. Lee, Detection Dogs: Learning to Pass the Sniff Test, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 8, 
2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/04/130407/detection-dogs-learning-to-pass-
the-sniff-test/ [https://perma.cc/Y83G-CQGR]. 
85. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); see also Kenneth R. Wallentine, Dogs 
Are a Prosecutor’s Best Friend: Canine Search and Seizure Law, PROSECUTOR, Sept.–Oct. 1997, 
at 31.  
86. To be clear, the Fourth Amendment only protects against government action, and only 
government action can constitute a “search” or “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). For Fourth Amendment purposes, 
a search occurs when a government action: (1) infringes on “an expectation of privacy that society is 
prepared to consider reasonable”; or (2) intrudes onto a constitutionally protected area—i.e., persons, 
houses, papers and effects. Id. (expectation of privacy); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) 
(constitutionally protected area). By contrast, a person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when a reasonable person would not “feel free to terminate the encounter” with law 
enforcement. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002). Property is seized for Fourth 
Amendment purposes “when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory 
interests in that property.” Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. 
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telephone booth;87 (2) the installation and use of a pen register at a phone 
company’s central office;88 and (3) police reliance on a wired informant 
to listen to a suspect’s conversations.89 
But the role of dogs in the search calculus presented a new challenge 
for the Supreme Court. In United States v. Place,90 Raymond Place caught 
the eyes of law enforcement while waiting in line at Miami International 
Airport to buy a plane ticket to New York’s La Guardia airport.91 Federal 
agents then met Place at La Guardia and detained his luggage in order to 
subject the bags to a “sniff test” by a trained drug detection dog.92 The dog 
alerted to Place’s luggage, and the agents, after opening the luggage, 
discovered more than 1,000 grams of cocaine.93 
After pleading guilty in federal court for possession of cocaine with the 
intent to distribute, Place appealed to the Supreme Court and argued, in 
part, that the warrantless seizure of his luggage violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights.94 Although the Supreme Court sided with Place, it 
separately held along the way that the dog sniff of Place’s luggage  “did 
not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”95 
A majority of the Court reasoned that a dog sniff involves only a “limited 
disclosure” that does not subject the property owner “to the 
embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more 
intrusive investigative methods.”96 Accordingly, said the Court, a dog 
sniff is “sui generis”97—i.e., unique.98 
The Court did little to clarify the implications of Place for roughly two 
 
87. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
88. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979). 
89. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746–47 (1971). 
90. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
91. Id. at 698.   
92. Id. at 699.  
93. Id.  
94. Id. at 700. 
95. Id. at 707. 
96. Id.  
97. Id. Interestingly, some commentators view the Place Court’s discussion of the search issue as 
merely dictum. See Hope Walker Hall, Comment, Sniffing Out the Fourth Amendment: United States 
v. Place—Dog Sniffs—Ten Years Later, 46 ME. L. REV. 151, 152 (1994) (noting that Place 
“announced in dictum that a canine sniff of luggage in an airport was not a ‘search’” though 
acknowledging that its doing so “has not prevented subsequent courts from expanding and further 
delineating the rather terse assertion by the Court that sniffs are not searches”). 
98. Sui generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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decades.99 Lacking clear guidance from the Supreme Court,100 lower 
courts at the federal and state levels struggled with the question of whether 
a dog sniff could ever constitute a Fourth Amendment search.101 Just a 
few months after Place, for example, the Ninth Circuit (briefly) added a 
suspicion requirement to dog sniffs of airport luggage.102 Then, in 1985, 
the Second Circuit held that a dog alert used to generate probable cause to 
enter a home constituted a “search.”103 
As lower courts continued to offer differing approaches to the Fourth 
Amendment implications of dog sniffs,104 the Supreme Court in 2005 
directly considered whether law enforcement’s use of a 
narcotics-detection dog at a traffic stop constituted a “search.”105 Relying 
 
99. Questions about the core premise of Place persisted on the Supreme Court. In 1984, for 
example, the Court decided United States v. Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 109 (1984). Admittedly, Jacobsen 
did not involve a dog sniff; rather, it considered whether use of a chemical field test to detect cocaine 
constituted a search. Id. at 121–23. In holding that no search occurred, the Court relied on Place and 
reasoned that the field test, like a dog sniff, could reveal only the presence or absence of contraband. 
Id. at 123. But Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent called Place “dangerously incorrect.” Id. at 
136 (Brennan, J., dissenting). To their minds, “the use of techniques like the dog sniff at issue in Place 
constitutes a search whenever the police employ such techniques to secure any information about an 
item that is concealed in a container that we are prepared to view as supporting a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.” Id. at 142. 
100. Dogs sniffs seemingly remained outside Fourth Amendment protections in Indianapolis v. 
Edmond. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). In Edmond, approximately thirty officers staffed a checkpoint where 
police stopped a predetermined number of vehicles. Id. at 35. Following the stop, an officer would 
approach the vehicle, inform the driver about the purpose for the stop, request the driver’s license and 
registration, and look for signs of impairment. Id. As one officer interacted with the driver, another 
officer walked a narcotics-detection dog around the stopped vehicle. Id. Although the Court’s opinion 
focused largely on explaining why the vehicle checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment, it did 
comment that officers’ use of a dog at the checkpoint did not constitute a search. See id. at 40–41. 
Citing Place, the Court indicated that “[t]he fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection dog around 
the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the seizure into a search.” 
Id. at 40. 
101. Federal decisions. See United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1998); United States 
v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Watson, 783 F. Supp. 258, 264–65 
(E.D. Va. 1992); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Quinn, 
815 F.2d 153, 159 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 1985). State 
decisions. See State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805, 807 (Neb. 1999); People v. May, 886 P.2d 280, 283 
(Colo. 1994), abrogated by People v. Esparza, 2012 CO 22, 272 P.3d 367, abrogated by People v. 
McKnight, 2019 CO 36, 446 P.3d 397; Illinois v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 662 (Ill. 1994); State v. 
Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 717 (N.H. 1990); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 78 (Pa. 1987). 
102. United States v. Beale, 731 F.2d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit issued a revised 
opinion en banc one year later vacating its suspicion requirement. United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 
1289, 1290 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
103. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985). 
104. Compare Fitzgerald v. Maryland, 864 A.2d 1006, 1015 (Md. 2004), and State v. Wiegand, 
645 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Minn. 2002), with United States v. Jackson, No. IP 03-79-CR-1H/F, 2004 
WL 1784756, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2004), and People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 673 (Colo. 2001), 
abrogated by Esparza, 272 P.3d 367. 
105. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). 
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in part on Place, the Court in Illinois v. Caballes106 held that “the use of a 
well-trained narcotics-detection dog—one that ‘does not expose 
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public 
view,’—during a lawful traffic stop generally does not implicate 
legitimate privacy interests.”107 A majority of the Court reasoned that a 
dog sniff does not meaningfully intrude on privacy interests because it 
reveals only the presence or absence of contraband.108 
The cumulative impact of Place and Caballes was significant. In the 
immediate wake of Place and Caballes, lower courts generally assumed 
that dog sniffs were per se non-searches.109 As a result, law enforcement 
extended the use of dog sniffs beyond airport luggage and traffic stops, 
and into homes.110 But as police reliance on dog sniffs expanded into the 
home, some lower courts pushed back; indeed, several state courts held 
that such sniffs constituted a “search” under their respective state 
constitutions,111 or otherwise required individualized suspicion 
to conduct.112 
Debate persisted among lower courts about whether Fourth 
Amendment protections changed depending on the location of a dog 
sniff—until 2013.113 In Florida v. Jardines,114 the Court for the first time 
clarified that some dog sniffs do, in fact, implicate Fourth Amendment 
protections.115 In Jardines, police approached Joelis Jardines’s home with 
 
106. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).  
107. Id. at 409 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). 
108. Id. at 410. Justice Souter dissented, famously commenting that “[t]he infallible dog . . . is a 
creature of legal fiction.” Id. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
109. E.g., People v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that “[t]he 
majority of the federal circuit courts have viewed the Place Court’s holding as a general categorization 
of canine sniffs as nonsearches” and likewise holding that a canine sniff is not a Fourth Amendment 
“search”).  
110. See United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sklar, 721 F. 
Supp. 7, 14 (D. Mass. 1989); Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d 224, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); 
Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1030 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003).  
111. See State v. Guillen, 213 P.3d 230, 239 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); Hoop v. State, 909 N.E.2d 463, 
470 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (N.Y. 1990); State v. Woljevach, 
160 Ohio App.3d 757, 2005-Ohio-2085, 828 N.E.2d 1015, at ¶ 19; State v. Dearman, 92 Wash. App. 
630, 637, 962 P.2d 850, 854 (1998). 
112. See State v. Baumann, 759 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Tackitt, 2003 
MT 81, ¶ 31, 315 Mont. 59, 67 P.3d 295; People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 672 (Colo. 2001); State v. 
Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805, 811 (Neb. 1999); Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 560 (Pa. 1993); 
State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 716–17 (N.H. 1990). 
113. See United States v. Hayes, 551 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 2008); State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 
1184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Driggers, 853 N.E.2d 414, 419 (Ill. 2006). See generally 
State v. Guillen, 223 P.3d 658, 663 (Ariz. 2010). 
114. 569 U.S. 1 (2013).  
115. Id. at 11–12. 
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a drug-detection dog on a six-foot leash.116 The dog, trained to detect the 
scent of several drugs, alerted once on the presence of Jardines’s front 
porch.117 On the basis of the dog’s alert, police obtained a warrant to 
search Jardines’s home and discovered marijuana plants upon executing 
the warrant.118 
Jardines appealed his subsequent conviction for trafficking in cannabis, 
arguing that the use of a dog to investigate his home constituted a 
warrantless and unsupported Fourth Amendment search.119 The Supreme 
Court agreed, holding that law enforcement’s “use of trained police dogs 
to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”120 It reasoned that the dog 
sniff constituted an “unlicensed physical intrusion” into, in this case, the 
home’s curtilage, which the Court regarded as “the classic exemplar of an 
area adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity of home 
life extends.’”121 
In the aftermath of Jardines, then, officers may—without a warrant or 
probable cause—conduct a dog sniff anywhere outside a “constitutionally 
protected area.”122 Or, in summary, dog sniffs of any person or property 
outside of the home or its curtilage remain governed by Place/Caballes 
and are not considered searches within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.123 
2. Dog Alerts and Probable Cause 
Separate from the question of whether a dog sniff implicates the Fourth 
Amendment is the associated question of whether a positive dog alert 
amounts to probable cause or some lesser quantum of individualized 
suspicion. Assuming that a positive dog alert constitutes some amount of 
individualized suspicion, a related question exists about whether that 
suspicion entitles an officer to search or seize—or both. 
 
116. Id. at 4. 
117. Id.  
118. Id.  
119. Id. at 5. 
120. Id. at 11–12. 
121. Id. at 7. 
122. Id. at 11; see also United States v. Parrilla, No. 13 Cr. 360(AJN), 2014 WL 2111680, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2014), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Kirk Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2018); 
State v. Foncette, 356 P.3d 328, 331 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015); State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512, 521 
(Minn. 2018). 
123. See United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Winters, 782 
F.3d 289, 297 (6th Cir. 2015); State v. Williams, 2015 ND 103, ¶ 26, 862 N.W.2d 831, 838. To be 
clear, then, an investigative dog sniff outside of the home or its curtilage is a nonsearch pursuant to 
both the Katz “expectation-of-privacy” test and the Jardines “constitutional-trespass” test. 
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Let’s begin with a brief overview of probable cause. Probable cause is 
the justification or quantum of suspicion generally necessary to support 
law enforcement acquiring a warrant, executing an arrest, or 
searching/seizing property. According to the Supreme Court’s 
well-known decision in Illinois v. Gates124: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set 
forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and 
“basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, 
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place.125 
Interestingly, the Court has never quantified probable cause. Instead, it 
has called probable cause a “fluid concept”126 that is “incapable of precise 
definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with 
probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.”127 The 
Court, however, has noted that probable cause is a standard more 
demanding than reasonable suspicion, but less demanding than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.128 
Moreover, the Court has made clear that the definition of probable 
cause varies depending on the type of Fourth Amendment intrusion at 
issue. Probable cause to seize a person (i.e., make an arrest) roughly 
translates to the “evidence which would ‘warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief’ that a felony has been committed.”129 Probable cause 
to seize property, by contrast, exists when a reasonable person would 
“associate the property with criminal activity.”130 Finally, probable cause 
to search is defined as “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place.”131 
The Court has also emphasized that the probable cause standard is an 
objective concept where the subjective motivations of an officer are 
irrelevant. Thus, an officer’s underlying motivations do not play a role 
when determining the existence of probable cause to search or seize. That 
said, courts generally do consider an officer’s subjective attributes when 
determining the existence of probable cause. For example, courts often 
 
124. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
125. Id. at 238.  
126. Id. at 232. 
127. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). 
128. See Rudolph v. Commonwealth, 722 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Va. 2009). 
129. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
130. Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). 
131. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
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consider an officer’s knowledge or expertise,132 personal experience 
patrolling a particular area,133 and/or the number of years the officer 
has served.134 
With that background in mind, let’s turn to the first question presented 
at the outset of section I.B.2: Whether a positive dog alert provides a 
sufficient amount of quantifiable suspicion to establish probable cause. In 
1983, the Supreme Court peripherally addressed that very question in 
Florida v. Royer.135 In Royer, two detectives approached Mark Royer at 
Miami International Airport because Royer fit a “drug courier profile.”136 
After obtaining Royer’s airline ticket and driver’s license, the detectives 
asked him to accompany them to a separate private room adjacent to the 
concourse.137 Inside the room, described as a “large storage closet,”138 
detectives obtained Royer’s consent to search his luggage and discovered 
marijuana.139 The Court reversed his conviction for felony possession of 
marijuana, holding that Royer was detained unlawfully.140 But in passing, 
and most relevant here, the Court criticized the state for failing to 
investigate Royer’s bags using “the least intrusive means reasonably 
available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of 
time.”141 In dicta, the Court offered as an example “the use of trained dogs 
to detect the presence of controlled substances in luggage.”142 Had a dog 
been used, the Court commented, “[a] negative result would have freed 
Royer in short order; a positive result would have resulted in his justifiable 
arrest on probable cause.”143 
But to be clear, Royer did not hold that a dog alert provides probable 
cause to arrest—indeed, the facts of Royer did not even include a dog 
alert—and no Supreme Court case ever has. Misunderstanding of Royer’s 
reach has created consistent confusion in the lower courts since its 
issuance in 1983. Despite Royer’s increasingly diminished impact,144 
 
132. See State v. Ellison, 455 So. 2d 424, 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
133. See People v. Hanes, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 212, 214 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1997). 
134. See State v. Litke, No. 2013AP1606-CR, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 196, at *12 (Mar. 11, 2014). 
135. 460 U.S. 491, 505–07, 505 n.10 (1983). 
136. Id. at 493. 
137. Id. at 494. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 494–95. 
140. Id. at 502. 
141. Id. at 500. 
142. Id. at 505. 
143. Id. at 506 (emphasis added). 
144. The Royer Court’s “less intrusive means” analysis to investigatory stops was indeed 
short-lived. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (“The reasonableness of the officer’s 
decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.”).  
Gallini (1)  (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2020  5:55 PM 
1742 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1725 
 
lower courts have nonetheless relied on its dicta to justify a number of 
police investigative activities based solely on a positive dog alert. For 
example, depending on the court and circumstances,145 a dog alert 
provides either probable cause or reasonable suspicion to search 
property,146 extend the length of an investigatory stop,147 or arrest a 
suspect.148 Relatedly, courts struggled during that period with the quality 
and quantity of evidence necessary to prove a dog’s reliability.149 
In 2013, the Court in Florida v. Harris150 clarified that a dog alert 
provides probable cause to warrantlessly search a vehicle pursuant to the 
automobile exception.151 In Harris, an automobile exception case, K-9 
Officer William Wheetley pulled over Clayton Harris for driving with an 
 
145. See Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and Probable Cause, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 9–
12 (2006); Matthew Slaughter, Supreme Court’s Treatment of Drug Detection Dogs Doesn’t Pass the 
Sniff Test, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 279, 287–88 (2016); Monica Fazekas, Comment, Pawing Their 
Way to the Supreme Court: The Evidence Required to Prove a Narcotic Detection Dog’s Reliability, 
32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 473, 474 (2012); Hall, supra note 97, at 153; Taylor Phipps, Probable Cause 
on a Leash, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 57, 59–61 (2014). In the context of traffic stops, consider that 
courts in Arkansas have held that the smell of contraband provides a police officer with “reasonable 
suspicion to detain the occupants to determine the lawfulness of their conduct, to search the vehicle, 
and to arrest some or all of its occupants, depending upon the particular circumstances.” Brunson v. 
State, 940 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Ark. 1997) (citations omitted). 
146. See, e.g., United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2010) (probable cause to search 
a vehicle); United States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2006) (probable cause); United 
States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999) (reasonable suspicion); United States v. 
Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 639 (9th Cir. 1993) (probable cause); State v. Foster, 252 P.3d 292, 297–
98 (Or. 2011) (probable cause). 
147. E.g., United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 2003). The Garcia-Garcia 
court was careful to note that, although a positive dog alert permitted the extension of an investigatory 
immigration stop, it did not provide the authority for officers to warrantlessly search those who are 
detained. Id.; see also United States v. Garvey, 956 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table 
decision). Consider also that the Sixth Circuit has held that a dog’s failure to alert to a vehicle provides 
police officers with reasonable suspicion to extend an investigatory detention so that another dog can 
investigate the vehicle further. United States v. Perez, 440 F.3d 363, 373 (6th Cir. 2006). 
148. See Kerr v. Morrison, 664 F. App’x 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Brown, 500 F.3d 
48, 57 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Simeon, 115 F. Supp. 3d 981, 999 (N.D. Iowa 2015); United 
States v. Claude, No. 08–03109–01–CR–S–ODS, 2010 WL 2010764, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 
2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 08-03109-01-CR–S–ODS, 2010 WL 2010779 
(W.D. Mo. May 18, 2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Claude X, 648 F.3d 599, 604 (8th Cir. 
2011); Chase v. State, 121 A.3d 257, 273 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015), aff’d, 144 A.3d 630, 647 (Md. 
2016); State v. Young, No. CA2011–06–066, 2012 WL 2700451, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Jul. 9, 2012). 
149. See United States v. Winters, 600 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Owens, 167 
F.3d 739, 749 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1376–77 (10th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22, 27 (7th 
Cir. 1980); State v. Nguyen, 2007 SD 4, ¶ 16, 726 N.W.2d 871, 876; State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 
762, 768–69 (Tenn. 2000); United States v. Delaney, 52 F.3d 182, 188 (8th Cir. 1995).  
150. 568 U.S. 237 (2013). 
151. Id. at 247–48. 
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expired license plate.152 During the ensuing traffic stop, Officer Wheetley 
walked his dog, Aldo, around Harris’s vehicle.153 After Aldo gave a 
positive alert, Wheetley searched Harris’s vehicle and discovered several 
ingredients for making methamphetamine—none of which Aldo was 
trained to detect.154 Harris was charged with possessing pseudoephedrine 
for use in manufacturing methamphetamine. Remarkably, while Harris 
was out on bail, Wheetley again pulled Harris over.155 Aldo again alerted 
during the ensuing traffic stop, although this time Wheetley’s search of 
Harris’s vehicle produced nothing incriminating.156 
Following the denial of Harris’s motion to suppress the evidence found 
in his truck during the first traffic stop, Harris argued on appeal that 
Aldo’s alert did not establish probable cause to support the resulting 
search.157 Although the intermediate state court affirmed his conviction, 
the Florida Supreme Court reversed and held that Aldo’s alert did not 
produce probable cause to search Harris’s vehicle because, in short, Aldo 
was unreliable.158 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed.159 The Harris Court confirmed 
that an alert by a “reliable” dog provides the probable cause necessary to 
conduct the warrantless search of a vehicle.160 A dog is generally 
“reliable,”161 said the Court, when “a bona fide organization has certified 
 
152. Id. at 240. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 240–41. 
155. Id. at 241. 
156. Id.  
157. Id. at 242. 
158. Id. at 242–43. 
159. Id. at 237. 
160. See id. at 248 (“The record in this case amply supported the trial court’s determination that 
Aldo’s alert gave Wheetley probable cause to search Harris’s truck.”). 
161. The Harris Court’s presumption that a dog alert is “reliable” originates from Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Place, wherein she concluded that “no other investigative procedure 
[other than a dog sniff] is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in 
the content of the information revealed by the procedure.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 
(1983). Both Justice O’Connor’s conclusion in Place and the Harris Court’s presumption that a dog 
alert is reliable have drawn considerable scholarly ire. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 145, at 15–18 
(calculating that a dog alert alone is accurate only sixteen percent of the time); Slaughter, supra note 
145, at 308–09 (concluding that “[t]he current Supreme Court approach to . . . drug detection dogs is 
fundamentally flawed” because it “introduc[es] . . . unscientific evidence into law enforcement 
practices, which allows officers to disregard traditional Fourth Amendment protections”); Fazekas, 
supra note 145, at 504 (“Although the Supreme Court and most lower courts have granted particular 
deference to the olfactory abilities of police drug detection dogs, the evidence is clear that the canine 
is anything but infallible . . . .”); Hall, supra note 97, at 152 (arguing that Justice O’Connor’s 
“discussion of canine sniffs [in Place] was strictly dictum” that allowed lower courts to expand “the 
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a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting.”162 Even absent 
evidence that a dog completed a formal certification program, the Court 
reasoned, a dog is reliable if it “recently and successfully completed a 
training program that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs.”163 
Since Harris, the Court has decided little if anything of note about the 
role of dogs and probable cause.164 But perhaps one other decision bears 
brief mention. In 2015, the Court decided Rodriguez v. United States,165 
wherein it held that a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop 
constituted an unreasonable seizure.166 The holding aside, Justice Alito’s 
dissent summarized his understanding that a positive dog alert during a 
routine traffic stop provides law enforcement with probable cause to 
search a vehicle.167 Illustrating how the principles established in Harris 
and Acevedo interrelate, he wrote: 
When occupants of a vehicle who know that their vehicle contains 
a large amount of illegal drugs see that a drug-sniffing dog has 
alerted for the presence of drugs, they will almost certainly realize 
that the police will then proceed to search the vehicle, discover 
the drugs, and make arrests.168 
Simply put, Justice Alito’s dissent nicely demonstrates that probable 
cause to search or arrest must exist before police can constitutionally 
search a vehicle or arrest a vehicle occupant.169 
Before moving on, we can draw a handful of conclusions about the state 
of the Supreme Court’s automobile exception jurisprudence and the 
impact of a dog alert on it. First, in order to warrantlessly search a vehicle, 
Acevedo makes clear that officers need probable cause to search the car 
and/or containers within it.170 Second, using a dog to sniff the exterior of 
a vehicle during a routine traffic stop does not constitute a Fourth 
 
rather terse assertion . . . that sniffs are not searches”); Phipps, supra note 145, at 68 (“If random dog 
sniffs occur on 100,000 vehicles, the probability that substances the dog is trained to detect are 
discovered upon an alert is 24 percent.”). 
162. Harris, 568 U.S. at 246–47. 
163. Id. at 247. 
164. Most recently, the Court declined to hear a petition raising the question of whether police use 
of a drug-sniffing dog outside of an apartment (i.e., in an apartment hallway) constitutes a “search.” 
See Edstrom v. Minnesota, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1262 (2019), denying cert. to 916 N.W.2d 512 
(2018).  
165. 575 U.S. 348 (2015). 
166. Id. at 350–51. 
167. Id. at 371 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
168. Id. (emphasis added).  
169. Id. 
170. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). 
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Amendment search.171 Third, a positive dog alert to a vehicle during a 
routine traffic stop provides officers with the requisite probable cause 
contemplated by Acevedo to search the vehicle—and nothing more.172 
That is, although a positive dog alert constitutes probable cause to search 
a vehicle, it does not provide probable cause to do anything more—like 
search the people inside the vehicle or arrest the vehicle’s occupants.173 
II. LOWER COURTS AND THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION: A 
CONFUSING APPROACH 
In an effort to calibrate the disconnect between Supreme Court 
automobile exception jurisprudence and lower court application of that 
jurisprudence, this Part explores a representative collection of lower court 
cases that faithfully apply the automobile exception. These courts 
unanimously agree that the scope of the automobile exception is limited 
to the warrantless search of a vehicle and its contents. Accordingly, these 
courts hold that if there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of a crime, regardless of the presence or absence of a dog alert, 
then an officer may lawfully conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle and 
its contents—nothing more. These are what Part II calls “the core cases.” 
At the federal level, circuit and district courts across the country have 
regularly—and unsurprisingly—applied the automobile exception to the 
warrantless searches of vehicles.174 Consider a routine example provided 
by United States v. Tamari,175 a commonly cited opinion from the 
Eleventh Circuit.176 In Tamari, federal and state law enforcement agents 
 
171. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). 
172. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013). 
173. E.g., JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 3:33 (3d ed. 2019); 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.2(e) (6th 
ed. 2020). 
174. Circuit Courts. See United States v. Hernandez-Mieses, 931 F.3d 134, 145 (1st Cir. 2019); 
United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 456 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Harwood, 998 F.2d 91, 
96 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Donahue, 764 F.3d 293, 302–03 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1123 (3d Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. 
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc); United States v. Schecter, 717 F.2d 864, 
870–71 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Brookins, 345 F.3d 231, 238 (4th Cir. 2003); United States 
v. Ervin, 907 F.2d 1534, 1538 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Markham, 844 F.2d 366, 369 (6th Cir. 
1988); United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 523 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walker, 900 
F.2d 1201, 1203 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 417 (9th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Mercado, 307 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Watts, 329 F.3d 1282, 1286 
(11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Caroline, 791 F.2d 197, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1986). District Courts. See 
United States v. Perry, 79 F. Supp. 3d 524, 535 (D.N.J. 2015); United States v. Phillips, 9 F. Supp. 
3d 1130, 1137–38 (E.D. Cal. 2014); United States v. Uter, 746 F. Supp. 298, 300–01 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
175. 454 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2006). 
176. Id. at 1260.  
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collaboratively investigated a large drug conspiracy run by Humberto 
Febles, who owned a yellow Hummer.177 During the course of the 
investigation, officers obtained a warrant to search a rural property and 
any vehicle registered to or owned by the occupants of that property.178 
While executing the search warrant, agents observed a yellow Hummer 
drive onto the property.179 One agent preliminarily searched the vehicle, 
but found nothing.180 A drug dog named Ho Jo subsequently walked 
around the vehicle and alerted. Agents then found $45,000 in cash 
alongside contraband implicating the Hummer’s driver—Jesus Tamari—
in the conspiracy.181 Following his conspiracy conviction, Tamari argued 
on appeal that the Hummer searches were improper.182 
A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held as a 
preliminary matter that the warrant justified both Hummer searches.183 
Even had it not, the court further held, the automobile exception justified 
both searches.184 With respect to the first search, the court reasoned that 
agents had probable cause to believe the Hummer contained evidence of 
the suspected drug conspiracy.185 As to the second search, the court 
reasoned that Ho Jo’s “positive alert was itself sufficient to give agents 
probable cause to search the Hummer a second time.”186 Tamari, then, 
offers a solid baseline illustration for how the automobile exception 
operates—alongside its limitations. That is, it illustrates how the 
automobile exception works to justify the search of a traditional vehicle 
both with and without a dog alert. But Tamari makes clear that each 
Fourth Amendment intrusion must be supported by independent 
probable cause.187 
But the automobile exception has also been applied to support the 




179. Id.  
180. Id.  
181. Id. at 1261. 
182. Id.  
183. Id. at 1264. 
184. Id. at 1263. 
185. Id. at 1264. 
186. Id. at 1265. 
187. Id. 
188. For example, although undecided by the Supreme Court, a number of federal circuits have 
concluded the automobile exception applies to aircraft. See United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100, 107 
(6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530, 534 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gooch, 
603 F.2d 122, 124–25 (10th Cir. 1979). The Tenth Circuit has also applied the automobile exception 
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oft-cited opinion in United States v. Navas,189 wherein a panel of the 
Second Circuit considered whether the automobile exception supported 
the warrantless search of “a trailer, unhitched from its cab and parked in 
a warehouse.”190 In holding that the exception applies, the Navas court 
first highlighted the rationales supporting the exception: A vehicle is both 
inherently mobile and subject to a reduced expectation of privacy.191 
Drawing from those twin rationales, the court first reasoned that the trailer 
was inherently mobile because it was: “(1) affixed with at least one axle 
and a set of wheels; and (2) capable of being attached to a cab and driven 
away.”192 The court further reasoned that the reduced-privacy rationale 
“applies forcefully” because of “the nature and scope of the regulations 
relating to the commercial trucking industry.”193 
Other federal precedent has applied the automobile exception to fact 
patterns unaddressed by Supreme Court jurisprudence. For instance, the 
court in United States v. Howard,194 another Second Circuit opinion, 
applied the automobile exception to a search of a suspect’s empty 
vehicle—empty because troopers had lured the suspect away from the car 
so that other officers could search it undisturbed.195 The court reasoned in 
part that “[e]ven where there is little practical likelihood that the vehicle 
will be driven away, the exception applies at least when that 
possibility exists.”196 
Consider also United States v. Holleman,197 wherein the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed David Holleman’s conviction for possession of marijuana with 
the intent to distribute, in part, by interpreting the automobile exception 
to validate two separate dog sniffs—one on the roadside during a traffic 
stop and another in a hotel parking lot following the traffic stop.198 
 
to the search of a houseboat. See United States v. Hill, 855 F.2d 664, 668 (10th Cir. 1988); see also 
United States v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481, 492–93 (5th Cir. 1978). 
189. 597 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2010). 
190. Id. at 493.  
191. Id. at 498. 
192. Id. at 500. 
193. Id. at 500–01. Even if the trailer was not truly mobile, the court recognized that the reduced 
privacy rationale could support application of the automobile exception by itself. Id. at 499–500. 
Other circuits have reasoned similarly. See United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Mercado, 307 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Matthews, 32 F.3d 
294, 299 (7th Cir. 1994). But see United States v. O’Connell, 408 F. Supp. 2d 712, 723 (N.D. Iowa 
2005) (“Because the van’s immobility was readily apparent, the court concludes it was not reasonable 
for the officers in this case to assume the vehicle was readily mobile.”). 
194. 489 F.3d 484 (2d Cir. 2007). 
195. Id. at 489. 
196. Id. at 493. 
197. 743 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 2014). 
198. Id. at 1155–59. 
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Regardless of a dog’s involvement, a common thread runs through the 
oft-cited core federal automobile exception cases: They authorize only a 
vehicle search. Or, stated differently, the probable cause in support of the 
vehicle search does not extend to either arresting or searching 
vehicle occupants. 
The automobile exception also remains popular among state courts. 
Indeed, an overwhelming number of state courts have adopted some 
version of the automobile exception.199 Like their federal counterparts, 
state courts generally apply the automobile exception to traditional 
vehicles,200 as well as non-traditional “vehicles” like aircraft,201 buses,202 
 
199. See, e.g., State v. Reyna, 71 P.3d 366, 369 n.5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (Arizona); Jackson v. 
State, 2013 Ark. 201, at 8, 427 S.W.3d 607, 613 (Arkansas); People v. Super. Ct., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
633, 645 (Ct. App. 2007) (California); People v. Zuniga, 2016 CO 52, ¶¶ 9–14, 372 P.3d 1052, 1056 
(Colorado); People v. Edwards, 836 P.2d 468, 471 (Colo. 1992) (Colorado); State v. Williams, 88 
A.3d 534, 547 (Conn. 2014) (Connecticut); Reeder v. State, No. 552,1999, 583,1999, 2001 
WL 355732, at *2 (Del. Mar. 26, 2001) (Delaware); State v. Betz, 815 So. 2d 627, 631 (Fla. 2002) 
(Florida); State v. Wallace, 910 P.2d 695, 714 n.16 (Haw. 1996) (Hawaii); State v. Anderson, 302 
P.3d 328, 331 (Idaho 2012) (Idaho); People v. Smith, 447 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ill. 1983) (Illinois); State 
v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 156 (Iowa 2017) (Iowa); State v. Conn, 99 P.3d 1108, 1111–12 (Kan. 
2004) (Kansas); Chavies v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Ky. 2011) (Kentucky); State v. 
Crawford, 2017-0025, p. 2 (La. 2/24/17); 210 So. 3d 268, 269 (Louisiana); State v. Melvin, 2008 ME 
118, ¶¶ 14–16, 955 A.2d 245, 250 (Maine); Berry v. State, 843 A.2d 93, 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2004) (Maryland); Commonwealth v. Dame, 45 N.E.3d 69, 81 (Mass. 2016) (Massachusetts); People 
v. Kazmierczak, 605 N.W.2d 667, 674 (Mich. 2000) (Michigan); State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 
771 (Minn. 2016) (Minnesota); Moore v. State, No. 1999-KA-00703-SCT (¶¶ 19–24), 787 So. 2d 
1282, 1288 (Miss. 2001) (Mississippi); State v. Lloyd, 312 P.3d 467, 474 (Nev. 2013) (Nevada); State 
v. Witt, 126 A.3d 850, 853 (N.J. 2015) (New Jersey); People v. Galak, 616 N.E.2d 842, 843–44 (N.Y. 
1993) (New York); State v. Isleib, 356 S.E.2d 573, 577 (N.C. 1987) (North Carolina); State v. Zwicke, 
2009 ND 129, ¶¶ 9–12, 767 N.W.2d 869, 872–73 (North Dakota); Gomez v. State, 2007 OK CR 33, 
¶¶ 14–17, 168 P.3d 1139, 1145 (Oklahoma); State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1014 (R.I. 1992) (Rhode 
Island); State v. Fischer, 2016 SD 1, ¶¶ 18–20, 873 N.W.2d 681, 689 (South Dakota); State v. Saine, 
297 S.W.3d 199, 207 (Tenn. 2009) (Tennessee); State v. Rigby, 2016 UT App 42, ¶¶ 25–29, 369 P.3d 
127, 137–38 (Utah); State v. Tompkins, 423 N.W.2d 823, 829 (Wis. 1988) (Wisconsin); McKenney 
v. State, 2007 WY 129, ¶¶ 11–13, 165 P.3d 96, 99 (Wyoming).  
Five of those states initially abandoned the automobile exception, only to subsequently restore it. 
See, e.g., State v. Lloyd, 312 P.3d 467, 474 (Nev. 2013) (Nevada); State v. Witt, 126 A.3d 850, 853 
(N.J. 2015) (New Jersey); State v. Zwicke, 2009 ND 129, ¶¶ 9–12, 767 N.W.2d 869, 873 (North 
Dakota); Gomez v. State, 2007 OK CR 33, ¶¶ 14–17, 168 P.3d 1139, 1145 (Oklahoma); State v. 
Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1014 (R.I. 1992) (Rhode Island). 
200. See generally Andra Levinson Ben-Yosef, Annotation, Validity of Warrantless Search of 
Motor Vehicle Based on Odor of Marijuana—State Cases, 114 A.L.R.5TH 173 (2003) (collecting and 
analyzing all state cases discussing whether an odor detected by law enforcement officers thought to 
be contraband provides probable cause to warrantlessly search a vehicle). 
201. See Cooper v. State, 480 So. 2d 8, 11 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Merchant, 490 So. 2d 
336, 341 (La. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Russell, 352 S.E.2d 922, 925 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987). 
202. See Green v. State, 978 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Ark. 1998); State v. Lovely, 365 P.3d 431, 434 
(Idaho Ct. App. 2016); Alvarez v. Commonwealth, 485 S.E.2d 646, 650 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).  
Gallini (1) (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2020  5:55 PM 
2020] CARS 1749 
 
and boats.203 In the recent representative case of State v. Storm,204 for 
example, the Supreme Court of Iowa in 2017 declined to abandon the 
federal automobile exception despite technological advancements that 
permit officers to obtain a search warrant while conducting a traffic 
stop.205 In Storm, Deputy Clay Leonard stopped Christopher Storm for 
failing to wear a seatbelt.206 During the ensuing stop, Deputy Leonard 
smelled marijuana coming from Storm’s Chevrolet pickup truck and 
observed Storm acting nervous.207 Deputy Leonard elected to search the 
vehicle and found forty-seven grams of marijuana and several pills.208 
Storm was charged with, among other crimes, possession with the intent 
to deliver marijuana.209 
Following the denial of Storm’s motion to suppress, the Iowa Supreme 
Court affirmed his conviction and upheld the search.210 Storm argued on 
appeal that the automobile exception should be abandoned because new 
technology allowed officers to obtain search warrants during a traffic 
stop.211 The court disagreed and elected to preserve the automobile 
exception—as measured by the federal standard.212 It reasoned in part that 
the automobile exception is “easy to apply” and therefore offers “the 
clarity of bright-line rules in time-sensitive interactions between citizens 
and law enforcement.”213 Although the court acknowledged that 
technological advancements may at some point require a change to its 
automobile exception jurisprudence, it did not view the ability of officers 
to electronically draft roadside warrants as a justification to abandon the 
exception altogether.214 To the contrary, the court commented, “forcing 
an officer to draft a search warrant application while multitasking on the 
side of the road may jeopardize the accuracy of the warrant application 
and would require motorists to be detained for much longer periods.”215 
But some state courts do maintain limits on the automobile exception 
 
203. See Mewbourn v. State, 570 So. 2d 805, 806 n.1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); State v. Sullivan, 
935 S.W.2d 747, 755 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Dahlem v. State, 322 S.W.3d 685, 689 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2010).  
204. 898 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 2017). 
205. Id. at 141–42. 




210. Id. at 144–45. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 148. 
213. Id. at 156 (quoting State v. Hellstern, 856 N.W.2d 355, 364 (Iowa 2014)). 
214. Id. at 155–56. 
215. Id. at 155. 
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pursuant to their own state constitutions or rules of criminal procedure.216 
In Oregon, for instance, application of the automobile exception is limited 
to vehicles that are mobile and occupied at the time police first encounter 
the car in connection with investigating criminal activity.217 Some states, 
like Indiana,218 Pennsylvania,219 Georgia,220 Louisiana,221 New York,222 
and Nebraska,223 decline to apply the automobile exception to the search 
of a vehicle parked on private residential property. New Jersey, by 
contrast, permits the warrantless search of an automobile “only when the 
police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband 
or evidence of an offense and the circumstances giving rise to probable 
cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous.”224 By way of final illustrative 
example, the automobile exception in Connecticut does not apply to a 
vehicle that has been impounded or parked.225 
In terms of core state doctrine, nothing changes when a dog is involved. 
Like their federal counterparts,226 state courts agree that a positive dog 
alert provides probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search.227 In the 
 
216. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-33m (West 2019). Consider also Colorado, wherein the 
sniff from a drug detection dog constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Colorado Constitution 
“because that sniff can detect lawful activity, namely the legal possession of up to one ounce of 
marijuana by adults at least twenty-one years old.” People v. McKnight, 2019 CO 36, ¶¶ 62–64, 446 
P.3d 397, 414 (Colo. 2019). Thus, in Colorado, “law enforcement officers must have probable cause 
to believe that an item or area contains a drug in violation of state law before deploying a drug-
detection dog that alerts to marijuana for an exploratory sniff.” Id.  
217. State v. Kock, 725 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Or. 1986); accord State v. Andersen, 390 P.3d 992, 998 
(Or. 2017).  
218. State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. 2010). 
219. Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 173 A.3d 733, 745 (Pa. 2017). 
220. State v. LeJeune, 576 S.E.2d 888, 892–93 (Ga. 2003). 
221. State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1384 n.1 (La. 1982). 
222. People v. Kreichman, 339 N.E.2d 182, 186–87 (N.Y. 1975). 
223. State v. Rocha, 890 N.W.2d 178, 207 (Neb. 2017). 
224. State v. Witt, 126 A.3d 850, 872 (N.J. 2015).  
225. State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315, 1325–26 (Conn. 1993); see State v. Winfrey, 24 A.3d 1218, 
1224–25 (Conn. 2011). 
226. See United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 789 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Foreste, 780 F.3d 518, 528 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Johnson, 742 F. App’x 616, 623 (3d Cir. 
2018); United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Clayton, 374 F. 
App’x 497, 501 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. McAllister, 31 F. App’x 859, 866 (6th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Simon, 937 F.3d 820, 833–35 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Gunnell, 775 F.3d 
1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Perez-Almonte, 487 F. App’x 328, 329–30 (9th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Brown, 24 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Parada, 577 
F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Maddox, 398 F. App’x 613, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
227. See State v. Blessie, No. 2 CA–CR 2008–0321, 2010 WL 1111555, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 
24, 2010); Hunter v. State, No. CACR 01-541, 2002 WL 242504, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2002); 
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straightforward case of State v. Tucker,228 for example, the Idaho Supreme 
Court upheld the warrantless search of Boone Tucker’s vehicle following 
a positive dog alert.229 In doing so, it reasoned that “an officer’s 
investigation at the scene of a stopped automobile can ripen into probable 
cause as soon as a drug detection dog alerts on the exterior of the vehicle, 
justifying a search of the vehicle without the necessity of obtaining a 
warrant.”230 Tucker is hardly anomalous; state courts agree that the 
automobile exception justifies a warrantless search of a vehicle and its 
contents—nothing more.231 But there are outliers. And their numbers 
are growing. 
III. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION’S UNFORESEEN 
EXPANSION 
Despite clear Supreme Court guidance to the contrary, Part III contends 
that lower courts have gradually expanded the scope of the automobile 
exception—and particularly so when a dog alert is involved—to include 
the warrantless search or arrest of a vehicle’s occupants. That is, unlike 
the core automobile exception cases discussed in Part II, a growing 
number of jurisdictions, including Illinois,232 Kansas,233 New York,234 
 
People v. Stillwell, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 233, 240 (Ct. App. 2011); St. Fleur v. State, 676 S.E.2d 243, 
246 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Buck, 317 P.3d 725, 727 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014); State v. Smoke, 
No. 39064, 2012 WL 9495963, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2012); People v. Reedy, 2015 IL App 
(3d) 130955, ¶¶ 45–49, 39 N.E.3d 318, 327–28; State v. Bergmann, 633 N.W.2d 328, 338 (Iowa 
2001); Grimm v. State, 183 A.3d 167, 206 (Md. 2018); State v. Cabral, 859 A.2d 285, 296 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2004); People v. Clark, 559 N.W.2d 78, 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Thompson, 
No. A13–1991, 2014 WL 4798896, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2014); State v. Kazazi, No. WD-
03-035, 2004 WL 1765404, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2004); State v. Foster, 252 P.3d 292, 297 
(Or. 2011); Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 1676 MDA 2017, 2019 WL 409647, at *9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 1, 2019); State v. Chavez, 2003 SD 93, ¶¶ 29–33, 668 N.W.2d 89, 99; Harrison v. State, 7 S.W.3d 
309, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Jones 
v. Commonwealth, 670 S.E.2d 727, 733 (Va. 2009); State v. Miller, 2002 WI App 150, ¶¶ 13–15, 647 
N.W.2d 348, 353. 
228. 979 P.2d 1199 (Idaho 1999). 
229. Id. at 1201. 
230. Id. (emphasis added). 
231. See State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. 2010); State v. Williams, 2004 WY 53, 
¶¶ 17–21, 90 P.3d 85, 90–91 (Wyo. 2004); Bergmann, 633 N.W.2d at 334. 
232. See People v. Stout, 477 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Ill. 1985); People v. Strong, 574 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
233. See State v. Fewell, 184 P.3d 903, 912 (Kan. 2008); State v. Greever, No. 95,303, 2008 
WL 5401107, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2008) (unpublished table decision). 
234. See People v. Dolan, 86 N.Y.S.3d 306, 307–08 (App. Div. 2018); People v. Rasul, 995 
N.Y.S.2d 380, 382–83 (App. Div. 2014). 
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Florida,235 Minnesota,236 Ohio,237 Kentucky,238 Oregon,239 Maine,240 
Wisconsin,241 and Texas,242 have at varying times misconstrued the 
automobile exception to additionally permit the warrantless search and/or 
arrest of a vehicle’s occupants. 
In doing so, those lower courts generally rely on one of two core 
rationales: First, as discussed in section III.A, many lower courts expand 
the scope of the automobile exception to include a vehicle’s occupants by 
misinterpreting the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement. 
Second, which section III.B addresses, numerous lower courts extend the 
boundaries of the automobile exception to permit the arrest of a vehicle’s 
occupants when only probable cause to search the vehicle exists. Across 
each category of lower courts, Part III argues, is a progressive 
misunderstanding and misapplication of the Fourth Amendment’s 
probable cause requirement and the limitation that requirement places on 
the scope of the automobile exception. 
A. Searching Vehicle Occupants 
Against overwhelming jurisprudence to the contrary, a number of 
jurisdictions have interpreted the automobile exception expansively to 
permit the warrantless search of a vehicle’s occupants. Speaking very 
generally, that search is typically preceded by either an officer smelling a 
controlled substance or a dog alerting to the same. Those cases involving 
a dog alert seemingly exacerbate the judiciary’s interpretive difficulty. 
The reasoning that supports opinions from those courts, as you will 
read, generally falls into one of three categories. First, many courts reason 
that the odor of a controlled substance creates an “exigency” that merits 
the warrantless search of a vehicle’s occupants.243 Second, other courts 
 
235. See State v. Reed, 712 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); see also State v. K.V., 821 
So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); State v. T.T., 594 So. 2d 839, 840 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1992). See generally State v. Betz, 815 So. 2d 627, 634 (Fla. 2002). 
236. See State v. Wicklund, 205 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 1973).  
237. See State v. Urdiales, 2015-Ohio-3632, 38 N.E.3d 907, at ¶¶ 38–39.  
238. See Lewis v. Commonwealth, No. 2017-CA-001598-MR, 2019 WL 413610, at *2–3 (Ky. Ct. 
App. Feb. 1, 2019); Bailey v. Commonwealth, No. 2007-CA-001963-MR, 2009 WL 276715, at *4 
(Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2009); Dunn v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 775, 777 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006). 
239. State v. Devine, 496 P.2d 51, 52 (Or. Ct. App. 1972).  
240. State v. Smith, 593 A.2d 210, 212–13 (Me. 1991). 
241. State v. Mata, 602 N.W.2d 158, 161–62 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). 
242. Saenz v. State, 632 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).  
243. Dog Sniff. See State v. Becker, No. 15-1840, 2016 WL 6902330, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 
23, 2016) (unpublished table decision); State v. Johnson, 737 S.E.2d 442, 447 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013); 
State v. Urdiales, 2015-Ohio-3632, 38 N.E.3d 907, at ¶¶ 38–39. Officer Smell. See State v. Moriarty, 
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rely on the search incident to arrest exception to justify warrantlessly 
searching vehicle occupants. Third, and of greatest concern, are lower 
courts that permit the warrantless search of a vehicle’s occupants based 
solely on the generic existence of probable cause. Each of those 
sub-categories, section III.A argues, progressively expands the scope of 
the automobile exception by ignoring the constitutional difference 
between probable cause to search property and probable cause to 
search people. 
1. The Exigency Cases 
The “Exigent Circumstances” doctrine is admittedly one of the most 
pervasive exceptions to the warrant requirement.244 Broadly construed, 
the term “exigent circumstance” conveys an emergency situation that 
permits an officer to conduct a warrantless search because the situation’s 
urgency makes obtaining a warrant nearly impossible.245 
Relying on that doctrine, a category of lower courts expand the 
automobile exception to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle’s 
occupants. Consider first a 1985 decision from the Supreme Court of 
Illinois.246 In People v. Stout,247 Stephen Eakle, a patrol officer, saw 
Robert Stout make an illegal turn and conducted a traffic stop of Stout’s 
vehicle.248 Stout then exited his car and met Officer Eakle halfway 
 
566 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Iowa 1997); State v. Greever, No. 95,303, 2008 WL 5401107, at *3 (Kan. Ct. 
App. Dec. 19, 2008) (unpublished table decision); State v. Farrow, No. 18CA011327, 2019 
WL 3891154, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2019); State v. Yates, 589 S.E.2d 902, 905 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2004); cf. Commonwealth v. Washington, 869 N.E.2d 605, 615 (Mass. 2007) (holding that a 
police officer is permitted in searching an individual’s  person when the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the individual is concealing evidence of a drug transaction and exigent circumstances 
justify the search). 
244. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 455 (2011) (“It is well established that exigent 
circumstances, including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to 
conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 147 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement is well-established.”); United States v. Martin, 613 F.3d 1295, 
1299 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[O]ne well established exception, justifying warrantless entry into the home, 
exists when the officers have probable cause to effect an arrest and face exigent circumstances.” 
(internal quotations omitted)); Wallace v. Lathrope, 60 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table 
decision) (“The law regarding the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement 
is well established.”). 
245. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013); see also Mitchell v. Wisconsin, __ U.S. 
__, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2543 (2019); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001); Mincey v. Arizona, 
437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978). 
246. People v. Stout, 477 N.E.2d 498, 502–03 (Ill. 1985). 
247. 477 N.E.2d 498 (Ill. 1985). 
248. Id. at 499. 
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between the two vehicles.249 During their interaction, Officer Eakle saw 
two other passengers in the vehicle and smelled marijuana.250 He then 
elected to warrantlessly search Stout, which produced a vial of cocaine 
and cocaine capsules.251 
Although the trial court suppressed the evidence and the intermediate 
appellate court affirmed, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed.252 In 
applying its interpretation of the automobile exception, the court held that 
Officer Eakle’s detection of a controlled substance indicated “that 
probable cause existed to justify the warrantless search.”253 It reasoned, in 
part, that Officer Eakle’s search was justified because “[p]olice officers 
often must act upon a quick appraisal of the data before them, and the 
reasonableness of their conduct must be judged on the basis of their 
responsibility to prevent crime and to catch criminals.”254 
In another representative case, the Ohio Supreme Court extended the 
automobile exception to permit the warrantless search of a vehicle 
driver.255 In State v. Moore,256 Sergeant Jeffrey Greene stopped 
Christopher Moore for running a red light.257 During the ensuing traffic 
stop, Sergeant Greene smelled marijuana and asked Moore to exit the 
vehicle, at which time he searched Moore’s pockets and found drug 
paraphernalia.258 In upholding the warrantless search of Moore’s person, 
the Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that Sergeant Green’s actions were 
appropriate considering the “compelling” circumstances—namely, 
“[h]aving to permit [Moore] to leave the scene alone, unaccompanied by 
any law enforcement officer, the dissipation of the marijuana odor, and 
the possible loss or destruction of evidence.”259 
The idea that an exigent circumstance supports the warrantless search 
of a vehicle occupant was likewise persuasive to the Supreme Court of 
 
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 500. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 500, 503. 
253. Id. at 503. 
254. Id. Illinois has not backed away from Stout. To the contrary, the Illinois Appellate Court relied 
expressly on Stout in 1991 to uphold the warrantless search of a vehicle occupant. People v. Strong, 
574 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). More recently, though more generally, the Illinois 
Supreme Court cited with approval the Stout court’s approach to probable cause. See People v. 
Gocmen, 2018 IL 122388, ¶¶ 30–34, 115 N.E.3d 153, 159–60.  
255. State v. Moore, 734 N.E.2d 804, 808–09 (Ohio 2000). 
256. 734 N.E.2d 804 (Ohio 2000). 
257. Id. at 805. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. at 809. 
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Kansas in 2008.260 In State v. Fewell,261 Trooper Mark Engholm stopped 
Ramon Fewell for speeding.262 Engholm approached the passenger side 
of the vehicle and informed Fewell’s passenger, Charles Brown, of the 
reason for the stop.263 After Engholm detected the smell of burnt 
marijuana, Brown admitted to smoking marijuana earlier that day.264 
Engholm searched Brown, found three bags of marijuana and $1,000 in 
cash, and placed Brown under arrest.265 Engholm then conducted a 
“pat-down search” of Fewell and found a switchblade knife, bent spoon, 
and glass pipe in Fewell’s pants.266 Once backup arrived, Engholm 
searched Fewell a second time and found a small bag of crack cocaine.267 
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Fewell was convicted of 
possession of cocaine, criminal use of a weapon, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and speeding.268 
The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed—as did the Kansas Supreme 
Court.269 For its part, the Kansas Supreme Court first held that Engholm 
had probable cause to believe that “Fewell had engaged in or was 
engaging in criminal activity based on the odor of burnt marijuana and the 
responses of Fewell and Brown during the traffic stop.”270 Relying in part 
on a predecessor case, State v. MacDonald,271 which upheld the 
warrantless search of a car,272 the court further held that “exigent 
circumstances existed in this case that justified the warrantless search of 
Fewell’s person in order to prevent the imminent destruction or 
concealment of evidence.”273 
Like an officer’s plain smell, various courts consider a positive dog 
alert to contraband an exigent circumstance that permits the warrantless 
 
260. State v. Fewell, 184 P.3d 903, 912 (Kan. 2008). 
261. 184 P.3d 903 (Kan. 2008). 
262. Id. at 907. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
265. Id.  
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. The suppression court concluded, in part, that “‘it would be ludicrous to think that you 
could search the car and not the people’ if an officer smelled a strong odor of marijuana emanating 
from the passenger compartment of the vehicle.” Id. 
269. Id. at 908.  
270. Id. at 913. 
271. 856 P.2d 116 (Kan. 1993) (construing an officer’s smell of marijuana as providing probable 
cause to conduct a vehicle search).  
272. Fewell, 184 P.3d at 910–12 (citing MacDonald multiple times). 
273. Id. at 914. 
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search of a vehicle occupant.274 Consider, for example, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland’s 2017 decision in Borkowski v. State.275 In 
Borkowski, Trooper Derrick Huffman and Sergeant Robert Stryjewski 
pulled over the driver of a silver Lexus, Elijah Borkowski.276 Roughly 
twenty-seven minutes into the stop, Deputy Kathleen Yox arrived with 
her dog, Gero.277 Gero then alerted—although not captured by the 
officers’ dashboard video—to the presence of narcotics near the front of 
the Lexus roughly four minutes later.278 The officers elected to search 
Borkowski, in addition to the Lexis, and found “a clear plastic baggie 
containing small pills” inside Borkowski’s pocket.279 
The circuit court ultimately denied Borkowski’s suppression motion, 
and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed.280 Without drawing 
a distinction between searching the Lexus and Borkowski’s person, the 
court simply concluded that probable cause existed because the circuit 
 
274. See State v. Jones, No. 03CA61, 2004 WL 3090198, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2004). 
275. No. 08068, 2017 WL 1435976, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 24, 2017). 
276. Id. at *2. 
277. Id. at *3. 
278. Id. The circumstances of Gero’s alert were particularly odd. Apart from his alert not being 
captured on video, Deputy Yox would testify later at Borkowski’s suppression hearing that Gero’s 
alert typically consisted of him sitting, although she was “unable to remember” if Gero sat in this 
instance. Id. Rather, she said, “there was a change in [Gero’s] behavior” and that signaled the presence 
of drugs in the vehicle. Id. There’s more. At the suppression hearing, Deputy Yox 
explained that Gero sometimes alerts by breathing deeply, and, when she was presented with 
Trooper Huffman patrol vehicle’s video recording of Borkowski’s stop, was able to identify 
when, based on Gero’s movement in the video, she recalled the K-9 alerting, even though Gero, 
in the video, was obscured by Borkowski’s car when he did so. 
Id. at *5. Despite the overwhelmingly concerning circumstances surrounding Gero’s alert, the 
suppression court found Deputy Yox’s testimony credible and concluded that an alert had, in fact, 
occurred. Id.  
Upholding Gero’s alert under these circumstances seemingly affirms the basis for the scholarly 
concern about Justice O’Connor’s belief in a dog’s reliability. See supra note 161 and accompanying 
citations. Other examples similar to Gero’s questionable alert exist. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 2013 
Ark. 201, at 12–13, 427 S.W.3d 607, 615 (finding that a drug dog alert occurred when the dog 
“exhibited excessive tail wagging and deep, labored breathing,” attempted to enter the driver’s side 
window, and “stood and stared at the door [of the vehicle]”); State v. Cabral, 859 A.2d 285, 290, 300 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (concluding a dog alerted although the prosecution was “unable to 
produce” video footage of the alert due to technical difficulties); State v. Chavez, 2003 SD 93, ¶¶ 22–
29, 668 N.W.2d 89, 96–98 (holding despite the absence of corroborating evidence that a dog alerted 
when the dog “started inhaling, sucking in, and being a Hoover vacuum,” at which point it “sniffed a 
little bit more, stiffened up, and then [received] . . . a toy”). 
279. Borkowski, 2017 WL 1435976, at *3. The opinion makes reference to this being the second 
time officers searched Borkowski but no description or reference to the first search exists elsewhere. 
280. Id. at *1, *5. The nuances of the procedural history surrounding Borkowski’s suppression 
motions are largely unimportant. By way of brief summary, the circuit court initially granted his 
motion to suppress and the state filed an interlocutory appeal. Id. at *3. The Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals reversed and this time the circuit court denied Borkowski’s supplemental motion to suppress. 
Id. at *4. 
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court found “Deputy Yox and her testimony credible.”281 Despite the 
absence of video evidence to confirm Gero’s alert, the court concluded 
that probable cause existed to search Borkowski and his vehicle.282 It 
relied on Gero’s unseen alert alongside “the information provided by the 
caller, and by Borkowski’s appearance and behavior after the stop.”283 
Other examples abound, but the point is this: Officers frequently rely 
on the generic existence of exigent circumstances developed during a 
traffic stop—either by an officer or a positive dog alert—to justify 
searching an occupant of a vehicle without a warrant.284 Even a casual 
reading of those cases illustrates that lower courts rely on the concept of 
an “exigency” or “exigent circumstances” as a catch-all that, if present, 
provides a boundaryless opportunity to search people without a warrant. 
Although the concept of exigent circumstances is admittedly broad, the 
Supreme Court has offered guidance on what factual circumstances 
qualify as accepted exigencies. Among other cases,285 for example, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Minnesota v. Olson286 is instructive on that 
question.287 In Olson, police suspected that Joseph Ecker had just robbed 
a gas station and fatally shot the station’s manager in the process.288 
Further suspecting that he had a partner, the police drove to Ecker’s home 
and, upon arrival, simultaneously met an Oldsmobile vehicle.289 After 
seeing the police, the occupants of the Oldsmobile took “evasive action,” 
but lost control of the vehicle and fled on foot.290 Police pursued and 
captured the driver, Ecker, but the passenger escaped.291 
The next morning, police received information that the passenger, 
 
281. Id. at *5. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. See State v. Martin, No. 115,753, 2017 WL 4848583, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2017); 
Commonwealth v. Valentine, 470 N.E.2d 384, 385 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984); State v. Smith, 593 A.2d 
210, 212–13 (Me. 1991); State v. Young, No. COA18-1232, 2019 WL 4453894, at *7 (N.C. Ct. App. 
Sept. 17, 2019); State v. Flowers, No. 2009-L-103, 2010 WL 2560078, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. June 25, 
2010); cf. State v. Currier, 521 A.2d 295, 298 (Me. 1987) (holding that probable cause arising from 
an informant’s tip and exigent circumstances permitted a police officer to search a vehicle occupant 
without a warrant during the course of a traffic stop); State v. Vanderveer, 667 A.2d 382, 385 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (holding that probable cause and exigent circumstances permit a police 
officer to warrantlessly search an individual located in a confined area that smells of marijuana). 
285. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011). 
286. 495 U.S. 91 (1990). 
287. See id. at 100. 
288. Id. at 93. 
289. Id.  
290. Id.  
291. Id. 
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Robert Olson, was hiding at a particular residence with two women.292 
Police dispatched several officers who surrounded the home.293 Then, 
“[w]ithout seeking permission and with weapons drawn, the police 
entered the upper unit and found respondent hiding in a closet.”294 Olson 
shortly thereafter made an inculpatory statement.295 
Olson filed a motion to suppress his statement, which the trial court 
denied.296 The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed on appeal, holding 
that no exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers’ entry.297 The 
suspect was, after all, surrounded and would have been apprehended had 
he attempted to flee.298 The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that it was 
“not inclined to disagree with [the Minnesota Supreme Court’s] 
fact-specific application of the proper legal standard.”299 More 
importantly for purposes of this Article, the Court approved of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s definition of exigent circumstances: 
The Minnesota Supreme Court applied essentially the correct 
standard in determining whether exigent circumstances existed. 
The court observed that “a warrantless intrusion may be justified 
by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of 
evidence, or the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, or the risk of 
danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the 
dwelling.” The court also apparently thought that in the absence 
of hot pursuit there must be at least probable cause to believe that 
one or more of the other factors justifying the entry were present 
and that in assessing the risk of danger, the gravity of the crime 
and likelihood that the suspect is armed should be considered.300 
In sum, for exigent circumstances to apply, police must generally believe 
that probable cause supports a particular and specific category 
of exigency.301 
Unsurprisingly, the four categories listed in Olson are widely accepted 
 
292. Id. at 93–94. 




297. Id. at 94–95. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. at 100. 
300. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); accord United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 
743 (9th Cir. 2010) (listing the Olson categories as accepted exigencies); State v. Dugan, 276 P.3d 
819, 828 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (“The courts have generally recognized four types of exigent 
circumstances that may obviate the warrant requirement . . . .”). 
301. See United States v. Eberle, 993 F. Supp. 794, 799 (D. Mont. 1998); People v. Celis, 93 P.3d 
1027, 1036 (Cal. 2004); State v. DeCoteau, 1999 ND 77, ¶¶ 7–8, 592 N.W.2d 579, 582.  
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by lower courts.302 And although lower courts generally agree that the 
Olson categories are not exhaustive,303 overwhelming Supreme Court 
authority counsels against expansion.304 To the extent that the Supreme 
Court has expanded the categories of qualifying exigent circumstances, it 
has done so in the limited context of “emergency aid.”305 
By contrast, an officer or dog smelling contraband during a vehicle stop 
does not fall within an Olson—or related—exigency. In the examples 
provided by Stout, Moore, Fewell, and Borkowski, unlike the factual 
categories contemplated by Olson, officers have seized the suspect and 
the suspect’s vehicle via traffic stop.306 They are accordingly not chasing 
the suspect or concerned about preventing the suspect’s escape. Any 
concerns about destruction of evidence are likewise mitigated by the 
suspect’s seizure, not to mention the fact that the officer’s observations 
and/or smells themselves separately constitute admissible evidence. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the overwhelming majority of 
exigent circumstances cases contemplate the legality of police 
warrantlessly entering a home—not searching a person.307 
Apart from well-accepted factual categories or circumstances that 
qualify as exigencies, the Supreme Court has likewise concluded that the 
exigent circumstances doctrine does not apply to minor offenses. In Welsh 
v. Wisconsin,308 for instance, the Court declined to apply the exigent 
circumstances exception when police entered a suspect’s home to arrest 
 
302. See State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96, 887 N.W.2d 554, 560 (referring to the categories listed in 
Olson as the “well-recognized categories of exigent circumstances”). 
303. See Struckman, 603 F.3d at 743 (observing “there is no immutable list of exigent 
circumstances”); United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1519 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting the “existing 
categories do not occupy the entire field of situations in which a warrantless entry may be justified”); 
State v. Telshaw, 195 Ohio App. 3d 596, 2011-Ohio-3373, 961 N.E.2d 223, at ¶ 25 (noting the 
categories listed by Olson are “not the only recognized types of exigent circumstances”). 
304. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[W]arrants are generally required to 
search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law 
enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.” (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978))); United States v. U.S. Dist. 
Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972) (noting the exigent circumstances exception is premised on a 
“few in number and carefully delineated” circumstances). 
305. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (“One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the 
need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.”). 
306. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436–37 (1984) (“[W]e have long acknowledged that 
‘stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a “seizure” within the meaning of [the 
Fourth] Amendmen[t], even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite 
brief.’” (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979))). 
307. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, No. 14AP–185, 2015 WL 2191107, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12, 
2015) (warrantless entry into suspect’s hotel room); State v. Lala, 2008-0484, at *4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 
12/3/08); 1 So. 3d 606, 609 (warrantless entry into home); State v. Dahl, 915 P.2d 979, 985–86 (Or. 
1996) (same). 
308. 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
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him for “a nonjailable traffic offense.”309 Lower courts have generally 
interpreted Welsh to limit exigent circumstances to serious crimes—i.e., 
not misdemeanors.310 As states and localities increasingly decriminalize 
marijuana,311 the idea that an officer smelling marijuana constitutes a 
“serious offense” for exigency purposes appears dubious. 
Finally, it is worth remembering that “exigency” as a concept is already 
included in the automobile exception’s framework.312 As the Court most 
recently recognized in Collins, “[t]he ‘ready mobility’ of vehicles served 
as the core justification for the automobile exception for many years.”313 
That mobility, the Court has likewise recognized (since 1925),314 is itself 
an exigency.315 But lower courts’ reliance on the generic existence of 
exigent circumstances ignores that core rationale. Taken to its logical 
extreme, it moreover suggests that the presence of any contraband creates 
a generic exigent circumstance. If correct, that interpretation would render 
the automobile exception superfluous at best and wholly unnecessary 
at worst. 
2. The Search Incident to Arrest Cases 
A second category of lower courts rely on the search incident to arrest 
exception to justify the warrantless search of vehicle occupants. Stated 
simplistically, the doctrine enables the police—at the moment of arrest—
to conduct an unqualified warrantless search of the arrestee’s person.316 
 
309. Id. at 742.  
310. See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 908 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001); M.J.R. v. State, 715 So. 
2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Ramirez, 49 Wash. App. 814, 820, 746 P.2d 344, 
346–47 (1987). 
311. At present, fifteen states have decriminalized possession (not distribution) of marijuana. 
German Lopez, 15 States Have Decriminalized—But Not Legalized—Marijuana, VOX (July 10, 
2019), https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/8/20/17938358/marijuana-legalization-
decriminalization-states-map [https://perma.cc/L3P2-PERM]; see Sarah Friedmann, What States 
Decriminalized Weed? Cannabis Laws Are Changing Across the US, BUSTLE (July 11, 2019), 
https://www.bustle.com/p/what-states-decriminalized-weed-cannabis-laws-are-changing-across-the-
us-17043680 [https://perma.cc/L3P2-PERM]. 
312. See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466–67 (1999); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 
940 (1996). 
313. Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1669 (2018). 
314. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925).  
315. E.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (“[T]he inherent mobility of 
automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous 
enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.”). 
316. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“It is the fact of the lawful arrest which 
establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search 
of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is 
also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.”). 
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The search incident to arrest doctrine involves two separate and distinct 
Fourth Amendment intrusions: first is the arrest—a seizure of the 
person—and second is the search of the arrestee.317 Note also that officers 
may not search the arrestee without the presence of a lawful arrest 
supported by probable cause.318 In other words, the probable cause must 
go to the arrest (the seizure). That’s important because, absent probable 
cause to make an arrest, officers may not search individuals’ persons for 
contraband without a warrant.319 
 
317. See United States v. Currence, 446 F.3d 554, 556 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[The search incident to 
arrest] exception provides that when law enforcement officers have probable cause to make a lawful 
custodial arrest, they may—incident to that arrest and without a warrant—search ‘the arrestee’s 
person . . . .’” (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969))). 
318. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (explaining that the constitutional validity of a 
search incident to an arrest is dependent on the constitutional validity of the underlying arrest—i.e., 
supported by probable cause); see also Currence, 446 F.3d at 557 (“[A]lthough a search can occur 
before an arrest is actually made, a search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its 
justification.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); United States v. Han, 74 F.3d 537, 
541 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Because a search incident to arrest is permitted only when there is a valid arrest, 
the validity of the arrest cannot depend on evidence found during the search.”). 
319. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (“The Fourth Amendment proscribes all 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” 
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967))). 
Of the roughly twenty exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, sixteen justify 
warrantless searches and/or seizures that are outside the scope of this Article. See Almeida-Sanchez 
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (international border exception); United States v. Biswell, 
406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (federally regulated business exception); United States v. Edwards, 415 
U.S. 800, 807 (1974) (post-arrest administrative exception); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 
(1978) (fire response exception); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 592 (1983) 
(boat boarding exception); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896–97 (1975) (traffic check point 
exception); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979) (license and registration check exception); 
United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1973) (airport exception); Downing v. Kunzig, 
454 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1972) (court house exception); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
341 (1985) (schoolhouse searches); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987) (custodial 
inventory searches of property at a police station); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973) (consent); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990) (plain view exception); Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (open fields); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) 
(prison cell exception); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971) (welfare exception). 
Of the remaining four exceptions, a search incident to a valid arrest is the only one that justifies a 
warrantless search of a citizen’s person for contraband in the context of a routine traffic stop. Cf. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that a police officer may stop a person who the officer 
suspects is involved in criminal activity and may pat down the person’s outer clothing for firearms if 
the officer has separate reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is armed and dangerous); 
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 584 (1948) (holding that the automobile exception does not 
justify searching a vehicle occupant’s person without a warrant); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 
148–49 (2013) (explaining that the exigent circumstance exception justifies a warrantless search of a 
person when “the needs of law enforcement [are] compelling” (emphasis added) (quoting Kentucky 
v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011))); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding 
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But the reverse is also true. That is, so long as probable cause exists to 
arrest, no separate probable cause is necessary to support the 
accompanying search.320 In Fourth Amendment terms, then, the search 
following an arrest is “suspicionless” in the sense that it does not require 
a justification separate from the arrest.321 Finally, in Rawlings v. 
Kentucky,322 the Supreme Court recognized that a warrantless search may 
precede the arrest, so long as the probable cause to arrest existed at the 
time of the search.323 The Court has separately cautioned that “an arrest is 
not justified by what the subsequent search discloses.”324 
But lower courts have broadly interpreted the search incident to arrest 
exception to permit even searches of vehicle occupants who are not under 
arrest. In 1977, for example, the Florida District Court of Appeal applied 
the search incident to arrest exception to uphold the warrantless search of 
all three vehicle occupants in Dixon v. State.325 In Dixon, at roughly 12:45 
a.m., a motorist advised Officer John Henderson that a black Buick with 
a particular tag number nearly ran her off the road.326 Officer Henderson 
identified the vehicle and, without engaging his cruiser’s lights, followed 
it to a parking lot.327 He then approached the Buick and, as he did, detected 
marijuana.328 Officer Henderson then called for backup and told the three 
occupants to exit the vehicle.329 When backup arrived, no arrest occurred 
and, instead, “Officer Henderson asked Officer Frank Owens to search the 
suspects while he searched the automobile.”330 During the ensuing 
 
that a police officer may search a citizen’s person following a lawful arrest based upon probable 
cause). 
320. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979) (“The constitutionality of a search 
incident to an arrest does not depend on whether there is any indication that the person arrested 
possesses weapons or evidence. The fact of a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search.”). 
321. See, e.g., Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause 
is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident 
to the arrest requires no additional justification.”); United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664, 667 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[E]ven though the reasons for conducting a search incident to arrest . . . may be 
stronger in some situations than in others, the Government is not obliged to justify each such search 
in the particular context in which it occurs.”). 
322. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
323. See id. at 111 (upholding warrantless search of individual before an arrest where “petitioner 
[already] admitted ownership of the sizable quantity of drugs”). 
324. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959); see Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543 (1990) 
(explaining that the fruits of a search incident to an arrest cannot be used to justify the arrest). 
325. 343 So. 2d 1345, 1348–49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). 




330. Id.  
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searches, Officer Owens found PCP hanging from the belt of James 
Dixon, the driver.331 
The Florida District Court of Appeal upheld the warrantless search.332 
Relying on the search incident to arrest exception, the court preliminarily 
observed that “if a warrantless search is otherwise valid the fact that the 
accused was not arrested does not render the evidence found inadmissible 
where probable cause to arrest existed prior to the search.”333 Applying 
that general rule, the court went on to hold that the “smell of marijuana 
and sight of smoke emanating from an automobile constitute probable 
cause to believe that both elements [of criminal possession of marijuana] 
are satisfied as to all of the occupants of the vehicle and that each occupant 
had actual or constructive possession of marijuana.”334 It accordingly 
affirmed Dixon’s conviction.335 The result in Dixon has since motivated a 
number of Florida appellate courts to authorize the warrantless search of 
a vehicle’s occupants based on the search incident to arrest exception.336 
For a more recent post-Rawlings example, the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals upheld the warrantless search of a vehicle passenger in its 1999 
decision, State v. Mata.337 In Mata, Juan Mata was a passenger in a vehicle 
stopped for missing a front license plate.338 During the stop, Deputy 
Sheriff Daniel Klatt approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and 
smelled marijuana.339 When the driver could not produce his license, 
Deputy Sheriff Klatt ordered him out of the vehicle and searched his 
person but found nothing incriminating.340 Officers then checked the 
records of the vehicle’s second passenger, which revealed an outstanding 
warrant.341 Accordingly, officers searched the second passenger, but again 
 
331. Id. 
332. Id. at 1349.  
333. Id. at 1347. 
334. Id. at 1348. 
335. Id. at 1349. Although the court’s analysis focused primarily on the search incident to arrest 
doctrine, it separately commented on the applicability of the automobile exception: “Other 
jurisdictions have affirmatively ruled that the odor of burning marijuana emanating from an 
automobile provides sufficient probable cause to arrest and/or to search the occupants as evidence of 
a crime . . . or as reasonable grounds to believe that the occupants had recently committed a felony.” 
Id. at 1348 n.5. The court endorsed that approach, emphasizing that “an automobile is not accorded 
the status of a dwelling.” Id.  
336. See State v. Chambliss, 752 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Harvey v. State, 653 
So. 2d 1146, 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Rogers v. State, 586 So. 2d 1148, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991) (Danahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
337. 602 N.W.2d 158 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). 
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found nothing incriminating.342 Finally, Deputy Sheriff Klatt ordered 
Mata out of the vehicle, searched his person, and found “a clear plastic 
baggie that contained two similar baggies with green leafy material that 
Klatt believed to be unsmoked marijuana.”343 
The trial court denied Mata’s motion to suppress the evidence found on 
his person, and the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed.344 In 
concluding that Deputy Sheriff Klatt had probable cause to search Mata, 
the court reasoned, “it is significant that by the time the police searched 
Mata, the other two occupants of the vehicle had already been searched 
and no evidence of marijuana or other contraband had been 
discovered.”345 That mattered, according to the court, because “the odds 
of Mata possessing the suspected marijuana had increased—not 
diminished.”346 Accordingly, the court concluded, the search was 
reasonable because Klatt had “probable cause to believe that marijuana 
was in the vehicle or on the persons of the occupants.”347 
These illustrative cases, of which there are many,348 present a clear 
constitutional problem. By interpreting the search incident to arrest 
exception to justify the warrantless search of multiple vehicle occupants, 
lower courts ignore the constitutional mandate that probable case be 
individualized to each suspect. The Supreme Court held as much in 
Ybarra v. Illinois,349 wherein it considered whether a search warrant for a 
public premises permitted the warrantless search of all persons present.350 
In Ybarra, police obtained a warrant to search a tavern and the tavern 
owner for evidence of heroin possession.351 During the execution of the 
warrant, officers conducted a “cursory search for weapons” of all of the 
tavern’s patrons.352 While patting down Ventura Ybarra, an officer felt “a 
cigarette pack with objects in it.”353 After completing the pat-down of the 
other twelve patrons, the officer returned to Ybarra, retrieved the pack, 
 
342. Id. 
343. Id. (noting that officers also searched the vehicle but found nothing incriminating). 
344. Id. at 159, 162. 
345. Id. at 160. 
346. Id.  
347. Id. at 161. 
348. See Carter v. State, 182 A.3d 236, 246 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018); State v. Fuller, 809 S.E.2d 
157, 163 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1192 (Pa. 2004). 
349. 444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
350. Id. at 87. 
351. Id. at 87–88. 
352. Id. at 88. 
353. Id.  
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and found heroin inside.354 
The Supreme Court suppressed the heroin by holding that officer’s 
warrantless search of Ybarra violated the Fourth Amendment.355 The 
Court held that the existence of probable cause to search a constitutionally 
protected area (the premises), does not automatically mean that probable 
cause exists to search each person within or near that same area. It 
reasoned that “[a]lthough the search warrant, issued upon probable cause, 
gave the officers authority to search the premises and to search [the 
tavern’s owner], it gave them no authority whatever to invade the 
constitutional protections possessed individually by the tavern’s 
customers.”356 Each patron on the premises, the Court further reasoned, 
was entitled to individualized Fourth Amendment protection.357 
The implications of Ybarra in the automobile context are clear. The 
smell of contraband emanating from a car, whether smelled by an officer 
or a drug-detection dog, does not provide police officers with probable 
cause to search (or arrest) any occupant of the car. Rather, as the 
automobile exception makes clear, an officer smelling contraband or a 
dog’s positive alert provides only probable cause to search the car.358 To 
be sure, the smell of contraband alone establishes probable cause to 
believe that contraband is in the car, but it does not provide the kind of 
individualized probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment to 
search any particular occupant. The fact that officers might discover 
contraband on a vehicle occupant’s person does not cure the problem; 
rather, as the Supreme Court in Sibron v. New York359 observed, “[i]t is 
axiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as 
part of its justification.”360 
3. The Probable Cause Cases 
A third category of lower courts—what this Article calls “the probable 
cause cases”—permits the search of vehicle occupants based on the 
generic presence of probable cause. Regardless of whether an officer or 
drug-detection dog generates that probable cause, these courts reason that 
the odor of marijuana coming from a vehicle, for instance, permits 
searching all of the vehicle’s driver and its occupants. Let’s look at some 
 
354. Id. at 88–89. 
355. Id. at 95. 
356. Id. at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
357. Id. at 91–92. 
358. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246–47 (2013). 
359. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
360. Id. at 63. 
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illustrative examples. 
One of the earlier cases to authorize the search of a vehicle passenger 
in a vehicle based on generic probable cause arose from the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s 1973 case in State v. Wicklund.361 In Wicklund, two 
officers observed a slowly moving automobile pass carrying three “young 
people” in the front and one in the back.362 The officers followed the 
vehicle, observed it driving erratically, and thought they saw the driver 
hiding something.363 
During the ensuing traffic stop, one approached the driver and smelled 
marijuana.364 Another officer proceeded to the passenger side, observed 
beer in the back seat, and elected to open the vehicle’s back passenger 
door.365 After also smelling marijuana, the second officer “ordered [the 
backseat passenger] to keep his hands raised and then proceeded to search 
him, finding first a small plastic bag containing marijuana and later other 
evidence including cigarette papers and a homemade pipe which smelled 
of burned marijuana.”366 
Although the trial court suppressed the marijuana, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court—quite remarkably—had “no difficulty in concluding that 
the officers did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.”367 It 
reasoned that the smell of marijuana gave the officers “probable cause to 
believe that one or more of the occupants of the automobile had smoked 
marijuana in violation of the law.”368 
Other states have accepted Wicklund’s holding that the odor of a 
controlled substance—particularly marijuana—provides probable cause 
to warrantlessly search a vehicle passenger.369 In 1998, for example, the 
 
361. 205 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 1973). Wicklund remains persuasive in Minnesota. See State v. 
Bartlette, No. C7-02-1669, 2003 WL 21743483, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. July 29, 2003) (“We have held 
that the odor of marijuana in a vehicle provides probable cause to search the vehicle’s occupants.”); 
State v. Doren, 654 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (“The odor of burned marijuana inside 
a stopped motor vehicle provides probable cause for the search of the vehicle’s occupants.”); see also 
State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 n.2 (Minn. 2009) (“We take this opportunity to clarify that the 
odor of burnt marijuana justified the warrantless search in Wicklund because it provided the officer 
probable cause to believe Wicklund possessed a criminal amount of marijuana as possession of any 
amount of marijuana was a crime under then-existing law.” (emphasis in original)). 
362. Wicklund, 205 N.W.2d at 510. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. at 510–11. 
365. Id. at 511. 
366. Id. 
367. Id. (emphasis added). 
368. Id.  
369. E.g., People v. Boyd, 700 N.E.2d 444 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). In Boyd, the Appellate Court of 
Illinois in 1998 evaluated the constitutionality of an officer’s warrantless search of an automobile 
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facts presented to the Court of Appeals of Texas in Small v. State370 
included that a police officer, Benjamin Risner, stopped Jimmy Small’s 
vehicle for a traffic violation.371 Then, during the stop, Risner smelled “a 
strong odor of burnt marihuana coming from the car.”372 Officer Risner 
had Small exit the vehicle, after which he frisked Small for weapons.373 
Although Risner found no weapons, he elected to search Small a second 
time for marijuana—remarkably by having Small “lower his outer pants 
to his knees.”374 Risner then searched Small’s “crotch area” and 
discovered cocaine.375 
The trial court denied Small’s motion to suppress, and the Court of 
Appeals of Texas affirmed.376 Citing a variety of Texas cases, the court of 
appeals held that “[t]he odor of marihuana alone is sufficient to constitute 
probable cause to search a defendant’s person, vehicle, or objects within 
the vehicle.”377 It reasoned in part that Small made a “‘furtive [hand] 
 
passenger during a routine traffic stop for failure to completely stop at a stop sign. Id. at 446. During 
that stop, two officers “smelled a stronger odor of cannabis from within the vehicle” as they 
approached the car where Gregory Boyd was traveling as a passenger. Id. One of the officers ordered 
Boyd out of the car and “began attempting to search him ‘for any controlled substances.’” Id. When 
Boyd refused to cooperate, the officer handcuffed Boyd and performed a warrantless search, which 
uncovered marijuana and cocaine. Id.  
Although the trial court granted Boyd’s motion to suppress, the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed. 
Id. at 447, 451. The appellate court held (quite directly) that “officers’ detection of the odor of burning 
cannabis emanating from the lawfully stopped maroon car provided the officers with probable cause 
to search defendant, who was a passenger in the car.” Id. at 450. It reasoned that  
[t]o hold otherwise would lead to the illogical conclusion that when a trained police officer 
detects the odor of a burning controlled substance emanating from a lawfully stopped vehicle he 
can search only the driver and not the other occupants of the car even though the smell was 
emanating from the enclosed space of the vehicle in which all occupants were present.  
Id. (emphasis in original).  
The Appellate Court of Illinois more recently reaffirmed the core principle of Boyd in People v. 
Rice—a 2019 decision. 2019 IL App (3d) 170134, 125 N.E.3d 546. In Rice, an officer stopped 
Jeremiah Rice for speeding and, during the traffic stop, smelled “a strong odor of burnt cannabis.” Id. 
¶ 3. The officer asked Rice to step out of the car, whereupon the officer searched Rice and discovered 
cannabis. Id. ¶ 4. A subsequent search of Rice’s car uncovered 1,300 pills containing 
methamphetamine. Id. The court upheld the warrantless search of Rice’s person and reasoned, 
“Illinois courts have repeatedly recognized that the smell of burnt cannabis emanating from a vehicle 
will provide officers familiar with and trained in the detection of controlled substances with probable 
cause to search a vehicle.” Id. ¶ 19. It added, “[t]his principle has been extended to include searches 
of the driver and any passengers.” Id. 
370. 977 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). 
371. Id. at 773. 
372. Id. 
373. Id.  
374. Id.  
375. Id.  
376. Id. at 775. 
377. Id. at 774. 
Gallini (1)  (Do Not Delete) 12/19/2020  5:55 PM 
1768 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1725 
 
movement’ toward the front of his trousers,” which entitled Riser to 
conclude that Small “had concealed marihuana in his outer trousers.”378 
Consider also People v. Neuberger,379 a 2011 case from the Appellate 
Court of Illinois, wherein Officer Dennis Asay responded to a report that 
“someone was hiding in the bushes on the north side of the post office.”380 
As he approached the geographic area, Officer Asay watched a person, 
later determined to be Karl Beyer, run through some bushes and get into 
the backseat of an automobile.381 Officer Asay pulled the vehicle over and 
saw three people in the car, including Jacob Neuberger who was sitting in 
the front seat.382 As the stop proceeded, Deputy Michael Holland arrived 
on the scene with Illo, his drug-detection dog.383 During a walk around the 
vehicle, Illo alerted, and Deputy Holland specifically ordered Neuberger 
out of the car.384 Officer Asay then “frisked” Neuberger and subsequently 
had him remove his shoes.385 Officer Asay found a “baggie” containing 
contraband in one of Neuberger’s shoes.386 
The trial court denied Neuberger’s motion to suppress, and the 
Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed.387 In doing so, the court recognized 
a line of precedent that permitted the warrantless search of a vehicle driver 
based on an officer smelling burning cannabis.388 Applying that precedent, 
the court saw “no reason to reach a different result . . . because the 
presence of drugs was detected via canine.”389 Although it recognized 
contrary Supreme Court precedent,390 the court nonetheless reasoned that 
“a dog’s alert to the vehicle, standing alone, will justify searching the 
occupants if there is evidence that having the dog sniff the occupants 
 
378. Id. at 775. 
379. 2011 IL App (2d) 100379, 959 N.E.2d 195. 
380. Id. ¶ 2. 
381. Id. 
382. Id. 
383. Id. ¶ 3. 
384. Id.  
385. Id. 
386. Id.  
387. Id. ¶¶ 5, 14.  
388. Id. ¶ 9. 
389. Id. ¶ 10. 
390. Id. ¶ 9. Specifically, the Neuberger court recognized the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948). Id. (citing Di Re for the proposition that “[p]robable cause to 
search a vehicle for contraband does not automatically confer authority to conduct an incidental search 
of the occupants of the vehicle, even if the contraband in question is the sort that could easily be 
concealed on one’s person”). The Neuberger court, sitting in the Second District, also recognized 
contrary precedent from the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District. Id. ¶ 10. (first citing People 
v. Staley, 778 N.E.2d 362 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); and then citing People v. Fondia, 740 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2000)). 
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individually would raise valid safety concerns.”391 
One other example involving a dog alert should suffice to make the 
point. In 2014, an Appellate Division from the Supreme Court of New 
York noted that “it is well established that [t]he odor of marihuana 
emanating from a vehicle, when detected by an officer qualified by 
training and experience to recognize it, is sufficient to constitute probable 
cause to search a vehicle and its occupants.”392 In People v. Rasul,393 
police were on the lookout for a particular vehicle suspected of 
transporting cocaine.394 While on patrol, State Trooper Gary Denise 
observed a matching vehicle change lanes without signaling and initiated 
a traffic stop.395 During the stop, Denise and backup State Trooper John 
Knoetgen smelled marijuana and, according to the court, conducted a “pat 
down and/or search” of the driver—Faqir Rasul.396 Because “the 
circumstances presented and the observations made by the troopers 
provided probable cause for Knoetgen’s pat down/search of defendant,” 
the court reasoned that “no basis” existed to suppress the drugs ultimately 
found in Rasul’s pants.397 
By raising two distinct constitutional problems, the probable cause 
cases comprise the most problematic category in this section. First, there 
is simply no exception to the search warrant requirement that permits 
officers to warrantlessly search a person for contraband based on a 
standard less than probable cause to arrest. As discussed in section III.A.2, 
there exists a search incident to arrest exception, but it requires probable 
cause to arrest—not search. Accordingly, the probable cause cases neither 
rely on the search incident to arrest exception nor any other exception to 
the search warrant requirement. Instead, those courts rely on the generic 
existence of probable cause to justify searching people without a warrant, 
which contradicts well-established Supreme Court precedent: Probable 
cause arising during a traffic stop from an officer’s smell or a 
drug-detection dog alert permits only the search of a vehicle and its 
containers—nothing more.398 
 
391. Neuberger, 2011 IL App (2d) 100379, ¶ 10, 959 N.E.2d at 199–200. 
392. People v. Rasul, 995 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (App. Div. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting People 
v. Cuffie, 972 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (App. Div. 2013)). This language has taken on a bit of a life of its 
own in New York. See People v. Sostre, 100 N.Y.S.3d 768, 772 (App. Div. 2019); People v. Dolan, 
86 N.Y.S.3d 306, 308 (2018); People v. Williams, 43 N.Y.S.3d 190, 193 (App. Div. 2016). 
393. 995 N.Y.S.2d 380 (App. Div. 2014). 
394. Id. at 381. 
395. Id.  
396. Id. at 381–82, 383. 
397. Id. at 383. 
398. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948) (“We are not convinced that a person, 
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Contrary to that precedent, the probable cause cases illustrate lower 
courts relying on probable cause to search a vehicle, pursuant to the 
automobile exception, to instead search a person. Although the Supreme 
Court has made it clear that every Fourth Amendment action—be it a 
“search” or a “seizure”—requires separate and individualized probable 
cause, those cases above hold that probable cause to search a car 
simultaneously justifies several other Fourth Amendment actions, 
including the search of a vehicle’s driver. Such an approach both 
misapplies the probable cause standard and deviates from the automobile 
exception itself. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “its name alone 
should make all this clear enough: It is, after all, an exception 
for automobiles.”399 
Additionally, in 1947, the Supreme Court recognized that probable 
cause to search a vehicle does not extend to the vehicle’s occupants in 
United States v. Di Re.400 In Di Re, officers stopped a vehicle in which 
Michael Di Re was riding based on their suspicions that the driver was in 
possession of counterfeit gasoline ration coupons.401 During the stop, Di 
Re was “frisked” and then taken into custody.402 At the police station, 
officers ordered Di Re to empty his pockets and discovered “[t]wo 
gasoline and several fuel oil ration coupons.”403 Declining to interpret the 
automobile exception to permit searching a vehicle’s passengers, the 
Court held that the warrantless search of Di Re violated the Fourth 
Amendment.404 Justice Robert Jackson reasoned for the majority: “We are 
not convinced that a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses 
immunities from search of his person to which he would otherwise 
be entitled.”405 
More recently, Di Re weighed heavily in the Houghton majority’s 
 
by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which he would 
otherwise be entitled.”); see also Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 (2018) 
(“[T]he scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself.”); United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) (“In short, the [automobile] exception to the warrant 
requirement . . . applies only to searches of vehicles that are supported by probable cause.”); cf. Henry 
v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959) (“The fact that the suspects were in an automobile is not 
enough [to justify the seizure of their persons and property. The automobile exception] liberalized the 
rule governing searches when a moving vehicle is involved. But that [exception] merely relaxed the 
requirements for a warrant on grounds of practicality. It did not dispense with the need for probable 
cause.”). 
399. Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1673. 
400. 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948). 
401. Id. at 583. 
402. Id.  
403. Id.  
404. Id. at 587. 
405. Id. 
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reasoning that the search of a person and the search of property are two 
distinguishable Fourth Amendment intrusions.406 Turning to Justice 
Jackson’s majority opinion for support, Justice Scalia wrote that Di Re 
made “very clear” the “distinction between search of the person and 
search of property.”407 Even the Houghton dissent viewed Di Re as 
directly on point, calling it “the only automobile case confronting the 
search of a passenger defendant.”408 The dissent commented that Di Re 
established a “settled distinction between drivers and passengers” that 
made it “quite plain” that the search of a passenger’s belongings involves 
a serious intrusion.409 Despite being divided over whether the automobile 
exception permitted the search of a passenger’s belongings, the Houghton 
Court was uniformly aligned in at least one proposition: The automobile 
exception does not support the warrantless search of 
passengers’ persons.410 
The import of Di Re and Houghton is clear;411 Di Re does not permit 
the warrantless search of vehicle occupants.412 Rather, as Houghton 
clarified, the automobile exception allows only for the warrantless search 
 
406. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999). 
407. Id. at 304 n.1.  
408. Id. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
409. Id. at 309–10. 
410. Compare id. at 303 (majority opinion) (discussing Di Re and noting that the search of a 
passenger involves “traumatic consequences” that are “not to be expected when the police examine 
an item of personal property found in a car”), with id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “the 
Court’s automobile-centered analysis limits the scope of its holding”).  
One year after Houghton, the Court applied the automobile exception to justify a pair of warrantless 
vehicle searches that took place following arrests. Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 939–40 
(1996). The Pennsylvania v. Labron opinion was inconsequential but for perhaps the Court’s 
clarification that the automobile exception does not require the presence of exigent circumstances. Id. 
at 940 (“If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the 
Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more.”).  
411. E.g., United States v. Moore, 390 F. App’x 503, 507 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Supreme Court case 
law is clear that the standard for searching a car is very different than that of searching a passenger of 
a car.”). 
412. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948); accord United States v. Williams, 650 F. 
Supp. 2d 633, 673 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (“[T]he automobile exception, while it may justify a search of 
the car’s interior and the personal possessions of its occupants found therein, it will not alone justify 
the warrantless search of the vehicle’s occupants themselves.”); Lessley v. City of Madison, 654 F. 
Supp. 2d 877, 901 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (applying Di Re to conclude that “[t]he smell of marijuana 
emanating from a car combined with the presence of rolling papers on a floorboard does not give 
officers probable cause to believe that a search of each of the occupants . . . was clearly established”); 
State v. Freeman, 290 P.3d 908, 909 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (“The state now concedes that the search of 
defendant was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because the 
automobile exception authorizes a warrantless search of a vehicle but not body searches of the 
vehicle’s occupants.”); State v. Mitchell, 622 N.E.2d 680, 686 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“After a review 
of the record and the authorities cited, we find that appellant’s mere presence in the vehicle did not 
justify the warrantless search of his shoes.”). 
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of a vehicle and its containers “capable of concealing the object of 
the search.”413 
B. Arresting Vehicle Occupants 
As if the appellate courts discussed in the previous section were not 
concerning enough, there exists an entirely separate group of courts that 
permit the arrest of a vehicle’s occupants based solely on probable cause 
to search the vehicle.414 This section offers a representative sample of 
those courts, which generally fall into two categories. First, those that 
misconstrue probable cause to search a car as probable cause to arrest the 
car’s occupants. Second, those holding that a positive dog alert alone 
provides probable cause to arrest one or all of a vehicle’s occupants—in 
addition to searching the vehicle itself. Section III.B concludes by arguing 
that both categories of cases abandon the probable cause standard 
guaranteed by the text of the Fourth Amendment. 
To begin, some courts construe probable cause to search a vehicle as 
sufficient probable cause to also arrest the vehicle’s occupants.415 
Consider, State v. Wells,416 where an officer smelled marijuana emanating 
from a van, searched the van, found five bags of marijuana, and arrested 
the van’s driver.417 Those facts, by themselves, are hardly noteworthy, but 
the Court of Appeal of Florida included some surprising comments in its 
brief opinion.418 Citing the automobile exception, the appellate court 
commented that an officer smelling marijuana from a vehicle “authorizes 
the arrest of such person and a warrantless search, either before or after 
the arrest, of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, and closed 
containers therein, for evidence of the crime.”419 
A more direct problematic example of a lower court relying on the 
probable cause to search a vehicle to justify the arrest of vehicle occupants 
 
413. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
414. See, e.g., United States v. Anchondo, 156 F.3d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1998) (multiple 
occupants); Chambers v. State, No. CACR 01-921, 2002 WL 343398, at *2 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) 
(multiple occupants); State v. Arrington, 556 So. 2d 263, 265–66 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (single 
occupant—driver); State v. Funkhouser, 782 A.2d 387, 402 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (single 
occupant—driver); State v. Voichahoske, 709 N.W.2d 659, 671 (Neb. 2006) (multiple occupants). 
415. See Partlow v. State, 24 A.3d 122, 132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011); State v. Overby, 1999 ND 
47, ¶ 13, 590 N.W.2d 703, 707; Branch v. State, 335 S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 
416. 516 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
417. Id. at 74–75. 
418. See id. at 75.  
419. Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)). 
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arose in Brunson v. State.420 In Brunson, Alton Brunson was as a 
passenger in a vehicle stopped for violating a noise ordinance at roughly 
1:30 a.m.421 Detective John Breckon, who stopped the car, smelled 
marijuana as he approached.422 He therefore ordered all four occupants 
out of the car and searched each of them.423 Following “a pat-down 
search” of Brunson, Detective Breckon discovered “a small quantity of 
marijuana and a package of cigarette rolling papers in his left front pants 
pocket.”424 He then arrested Brunson, searched Brunson’s person again, 
and found “two rocks of cocaine.”425 
The state charged Brunson with one count of felony possession of 
cocaine and one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana.426 
Following the denial of Brunson’s motion to suppress, the Arkansas 
Appeals Court reversed his conviction, noting in part that “[n]othing 
resembling probable cause existed until the officer searched appellant’s 
pocket and found the marijuana.”427 But the Arkansas Supreme Court 
reversed and affirmed Brunson’s conviction.428 In doing so, it found 
Brunson’s contention that the odor of marijuana did not justify the 
warrantless search of a vehicle passenger “without merit.”429 To the 
contrary, it upheld the search by reasoning that “the smell of the marijuana 
or its smoke emanating from the vehicle” gave Detective Breckon 
“probable cause to arrest the occupants of the vehicle.”430 According to 
the court, the warrantless search of Brunson was valid as incident to a 
lawful arrest.431 
In addition to the above examples, some courts rely on a positive dog 
alert to simultaneously provide probable cause to search a vehicle and 
 
420. 940 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Ark. 1997). The Brunson example is merely illustrative. See United 
States v. Beltran-Palafox, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1166 (D. Kan. 2010); Harvey v. State, 653 So. 2d 
1146, 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam); Richard v. State, 7 N.E.3d 347, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2014); State v. Reha, 686 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004). 
421. Brunson, 940 S.W.2d at 441. 
422. Id.  
423. Id. 
424. Id.  
425. Id. 
426. Id. 
427. Brunson v. State, 925 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996), rev’d, 940 S.W.2d 440 
(Ark.  1997). 
428. Id. at 443.  
429. Id. at 441. 
430. Id. at 442 (emphasis added). 
431. Id.; see also id. at 444 (Newbern, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority opinion as reaching 
a “remarkable conclusion” because “the search commenced prior to any arrest, and the arrest was the 
result of the search”). 
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arrest its occupants.432 In State v. Arrington,433 for instance, two deputies 
stopped William Arrington for speeding.434 During the stop, Arrington 
could not produce proof of registration or insurance and exhibited 
“nervous” behavior, prompting Crum to walk his drug-detection dog 
around the car.435 The dog alerted, and Detective Crum asked Arrington 
for consent to search the vehicle, which Arrington declined to provide.436 
In response, Detective Crum arrested and detained Arrington.437 A 
subsequent search of Arrington’s vehicle, pursuant to a search warrant, 
revealed thirteen pounds of marijuana in the trunk, cash under the carpet, 
and a vial of cocaine.438 
Arrington was charged with a variety of possession offenses and moved 
to suppress.439 The Court of Appeal of Louisiana affirmed the denial of 
his suppression motion.440 Without a supporting citation, it pointedly held 
that “[t]he dog’s alert, coupled with Crum’s observations and his ten years 
of experience, eight or nine of which were involved in working narcotics 
cases as time permitted, gave Crum probable cause to arrest [Arrington] 
at the scene of the traffic stop.”441 
At the federal level, United States v. Anchondo442 presents a concerning 
illustration of a circuit court interpreting probable cause generated by a 
dog alert to justify arresting a vehicle’s occupants.443 In Anchondo, Erik 
Anchondo was driving with his passenger, Felipe Garcia, when the pair 
 
432. E.g., State v. Harding, 9 A.3d 547, 577 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010). 
433. 556 So. 2d 263 (La. Ct. App. 1990). 
434. Id. at 264. 
435. Id. 
436. Id.  
437. Id. 
438. Id. at 265. 
439. Id. at 264–65. 
440. Id. at 266. 
441. Id. at 265 (emphasis added). 
442. 156 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir. 1998). 
443. Id. at 1045. Again, the Anchondo discussion is merely illustrative. See, e.g., United States v. 
Chartier, 772 F.3d 539, 545 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he fact that Reso alerted to the vehicle, coupled with 
the fact that a thorough search of the vehicle revealed no obvious source of the scent to which he 
alerted, made it more likely that the scent had come from one of the vehicle’s occupants.”); United 
States v. Romero, 156 F.3d 1245, 1245 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (noting in 
vehicle checkpoint context that “[a] dog alert alone establishes probable cause to arrest”); United 
States v. Klinginsmith, 25 F.3d 1507, 1510 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that dog alert to vehicle provided 
probable cause to arrest occupants); United State v. Garcia, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1253 (D. Kan. 1999) 
(“Even in the absence of the other information known by the troopers, once the drug dog alerted on 
the two vehicles, the troopers had probable cause to arrest Garcia and the other occupants of the two 
vehicles.”). 
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was stopped at a routine vehicle checkpoint.444 During the stop, one 
officer walked his drug-detection dog around the vehicle.445 After the dog 
alerted, Anchondo exited the vehicle, and the dog alerted again to the 
inside of the car.446 Although agents found nothing in the vehicle, they 
elected to search Anchondo’s person and found a package of cocaine 
strapped to his stomach.447 
Anchondo was charged with one count of possession with intent to 
distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine.448 He entered a conditional 
plea of guilt and appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to 
suppress.449 Before the Tenth Circuit, Anchondo conceded that the dog 
alert provided officers probable cause to search his vehicle, but argued 
that it did not permit searching his person without a warrant.450 The court 
disagreed. It first properly recognized that the search incident to arrest 
doctrine can apply even when the search precedes the arrest where: “(1) a 
legitimate basis for the arrest existed before the search, and (2) the arrest 
followed shortly after the search.”451 
Applying that doctrine, the question shifted to whether the officer had 
probable cause to arrest Anchondo at the time officers searched his 
person.452 In concluding that they did, the court wrote in a direct and 
controversial fashion that “[a] canine alert provides the probable cause 
necessary for searches and seizures.”453 Because the dog alerted to 
Anchondo’s car, the court reasoned, probable cause existed to arrest 
Anchondo.454 The court further reasoned that the “fruitless search” of 
Anchondo’s car “increased the chances that whatever the dog had alerted 
to was on” Anchondo’s or Garcia’s person.455 
The Tenth Circuit’s Anchondo conclusion has influenced a number of 
 
444. Anchondo, 156 F.3d at 1044.  
445. Id.  
446. Id.  
447. Id. at 1044–45. 
448. Id. at 1044. 
449. Id. 
450. Id. at 1045. 
451. Id.  
452. Id. 
453. Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
The court’s reliance on United States v. Ludwig is quizzical given that Ludwig involved a dog alert 
during a traffic stop that caused officers only to warrantlessly search the trunk of defendant’s car. 
Ludwig, 10 F.3d at 1525–27. Nowhere in the page cited by the Anchondo court does the Ludwig 
opinion suggest that a positive dog alert during a vehicle stop provides probable cause to arrest. See 
id. at 1527. 
454. Anchondo, 156 F.3d at 1045. 
455. Id. 
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other lower federal courts to hold similarly.456 Although state courts have 
not uniformly followed Anchondo,457 at least one has adopted its 
conclusion that a dog alert permits the warrantless arrest of vehicle 
passengers. For example, in Richard v. State,458 Officer John Weir stopped 
the car in which Charla Richard was riding because the vehicle’s driver, 
Christopher Fields, repeatedly crossed the center line.459 During the traffic 
stop, Officer Weir arrested Fields pursuant to an outstanding warrant.460 
After placing Fields in his squad car, Officer Weir walked his drug 
detection dog, Rex, around the vehicle.461 After Rex alerted to the driver’s 
door, Officer Weir ordered Richard out of the car, noticed she was 
favoring one side of her body, and “asked her to raise her arm.”462 A small 
tin containing meth fell from Richard’s shirt, and Officer Weir placed her 
under arrest.463 
The state charged Richard with possession of methamphetamine.464 
Following the denial of her motion to suppress, Richard was found guilty 
and appealed her conviction.465 The appellate court affirmed Richard’s 
conviction, holding that she was lawfully searched incident to her 
arrest.466 The court reasoned that the dog’s alert provided probable cause 
to warrantlessly search the vehicle.467 Without a supporting citation, the 
court then concluded that “because there was probable cause to believe 
the vehicle contained drugs, there was probable cause to believe any of its 
passengers had at least constructive possession of the drugs.”468 
Collectively, the foregoing cases provide an illustrative example of 
lower courts abandoning the probable cause standard all together. 
Although each case is constitutionally problematic, Richard is perhaps the 
most concerning moving forward because the Richard Court reached its 
erroneous conclusion based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
 
456. See United States v. Ojeda-Ramos, 455 F.3d 1178, 1183 n.9 (10th Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Chartier, No. CR13-0018, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154443, at *9–12 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 16, 2013); 
United States v. Beltran-Palafox, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1166 (D. Kan. 2010). 
457. Cf. State v. Anderson, 136 P.3d 406, 415 (Kan. 2006) (providing an overview of the state 
courts that have declined to follow Anchondo’s approach). 
458. 7 N.E.3d 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 
459. Id. at 348. 
460. Id.  
461. Id.  
462. Id.  
463. Id.  
464. Id.  
465. Id. at 348–49. 
466. Id. at 350. 
467. Id. at 349–50 
468. Id. at 349. 
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Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Maryland v. Pringle.469 In Pringle, an 
officer stopped a vehicle carrying three men for speeding in the early 
hours of the morning.470 The officer searched the car and found “$763 of 
rolled-up cash from the glove compartment and five glassine baggies of 
cocaine from between the back-seat armrest and the back seat.”471 
After each passenger denied ownership of the cocaine, the officer 
arrested all three men, one of whom was Pringle.472 Pringle challenged his 
arrest, contending that the officer lacked probable cause to believe that the 
contraband belonged specifically to him.473 The Supreme Court disagreed, 
observing that “[t]he probable-cause standard is incapable of precise 
definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with 
probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.”474 Viewed 
in that context, the Court held that it was an “entirely reasonable inference 
from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, 
and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine.”475 Accordingly, 
the Court reasoned that “a reasonable officer could conclude that there 
was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession 
of cocaine, either solely or jointly.”476 
Lower court reliance on Pringle to justify the arrest of vehicle 
occupants is misplaced for at least four reasons. First, and as a basic 
premise, Pringle is not an automobile exception case. Rather, it 
establishes the outermost limits of the probable cause standard to arrest.477 
Recall that the officer in Pringle found contraband during the search of a 
vehicle authorized by the automobile exception. Then, after discovering 
tangible evidence of a crime—rolled-up cash and five baggies of 
cocaine—the officer arrested the vehicle’s three passengers, each of 
whom denied owning the contraband. On those facts, the Pringle Court 
 
469. 540 U.S. 366 (2003). 
470. Id. at 366. 
471. Id. at 367–68.  
472. Id. at 369. 
473. Id. 
474. Id. at 371. 
475. Id. at 372. 
476. Id.  
477. See Tracey Maclin, The Pringle Case’s New Notion of Probable Cause: An Assault on Di Re 
and the Fourth Amendment, 2003–2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 395, 432 (arguing that the Court’s 
holding in Pringle was an overbroad expansion of the probable cause to arrest standard); Amanda 
Peters, Mass Arrests & the Particularized Probable Cause Requirement, 60 B.C. L. REV. 217, 238 
(2019) (describing Pringle as a probable cause to arrest case); accord Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 
621, 626 (Ind. 2017) (explaining that the Court’s holding in Pringle guides probable cause to arrest 
determinations); State v. Suddith, 842 A.2d 716, 726 (Md. 2004) (“[T]he Pringle case dealt with the 
lower threshold standard of probable cause [to arrest] . . . .”). 
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held that tangible and already-discovered evidence could justify the 
warrantless arrest of a vehicle’s occupants if no one admitted ownership. 
By contrast, investigating officers in Arrington, Brunson, Anchondo, 
and Richard first warrantlessly searched people—not the vehicle—by 
relying on a dog alert (Arrington, Anchondo, Richard) or their plain smell 
(Brunson). Only after this warrantless search were the suspects arrested. 
But no exception to the warrant requirement justifies the warrantless 
search of a person.478 Accordingly, lower courts’ reliance on Pringle to 
uphold the arrest of vehicle occupants dramatically misconstrues 
longstanding Supreme Court precedent. 
Second, as a general public policy concern, the absence of clarity in the 
law makes it nearly impossible to expect officers to properly enforce it 
while also eliminating the incentive to develop more thorough 
investigative techniques. The probable cause standard is already 
challenging for officers to articulate,479 but the judiciary has exacerbated 
the problem further by failing to clarify with precision how the probable 
cause standard applies separately to each individualized Fourth 
Amendment action (i.e., “search” or “seizure”). Consequently, the 
judiciary has deprived law enforcement of the benefit it receives from 
clarity in the law—a benefit the Supreme Court has long-recognized.480 
From a broader perspective, the unchecked expansion of warrantless 
searches undermines the historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment to 
serve as a restriction on government action. Indeed, “[u]ncontrolled 
search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the 
arsenal of every arbitrary government.”481 
A third more nuanced problem exists in the dog alert setting. Assume, 
as was the case in Richard, that a dog alert precedes the arrest of multiple 
vehicle occupants. Now consider the judicial force of misapplying the 
union of Pringle and Rawlings to the context of the automobile exception. 
Recall that Rawlings permits an officer to lawfully search a person 
incident to arrest before formally arresting the person—so long as the 
probable cause to arrest exists when the search occurs. If Richard is 
correct that a dog alert, post-Pringle, establishes probable cause to arrest 
all occupants of a vehicle, suddenly Rawlings justifies all the otherwise 
 
478. See supra note 319. 
479. See State v. Greene, 591 P.2d 1362, 1369 (Or. 1987) (“People subjected to illegal searches 
that turn up nothing incriminating do not appear in the criminal process. Illegal searches rarely surface 
in a civil proceeding because legislatures and courts have not created effective civil remedies.”). 
480. E.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979) (“A single, familiar standard is 
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance 
the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.”).  
481. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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problematic warrantless searches discussed earlier in this Article.482 But 
in that scenario, no contraband yet exists.483 Such an expansive approach 
wholly disregards the requirement of probable cause—one that “has 
roots . . . deep in our history.”484 
Most troubling is the fourth and final problem, which is one that will 
never make it into the pages of a reported judicial opinion. Consider a 
scenario where a dog alerts to a vehicle and all of its occupants are arrested 
and searched incident to their arrests, yet no contraband is found. What 
happens at that point? Perhaps nothing because there is no constitutional 
harm for the Fourth Amendment to remedy.485 Justice Jackson, the Chief 
Prosecutor in the Nuremberg trials and the author of the majority’s 
decision in Di Re, was deeply concerned about that very scenario fifty 
years ago: 
[A]n illegal search and seizure usually is a single incident, 
perpetrated by surprise, conducted in haste, kept purposely 
beyond the court’s supervision and limited only by the judgment 
and moderation of officers whose own interests and records are 
often at stake in the search. There is no opportunity for injunction 
or appeal to disinterested intervention.486 
Justice Jackson’s concerns remain prevalent today.487 Sure, the occupants 
could bring a civil claim, but that has little likelihood of success.488 That 
practical scenario emphasizes the importance of the probable cause 
requirement, the critical differences between probable cause to search 
versus arrest, and the basic limitation of the automobile exception. 
Collectively, probable cause to search a vehicle pursuant to the 
automobile exception justifies searching the vehicle—and nothing more. 
 
482. See supra section I.A.  
483. See Brunson v. State, 925 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996) (Newbern, J., dissenting). 
484. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959). 
485. As Judge Sneed once wrote: 
The Fourth Amendment protects the guilty because only by doing so can the innocent be 
protected. The innocent are not mere incidental beneficiaries of an amendment designed to 
protect the guilty. The innocent are its primary beneficiaries; the reasonableness of any 
expectation of privacy should be ascertained from their standpoint.  
United States v. Quinn, 751 F.2d 980, 981 (9th Cir. 1984) (Sneed, J., dissenting).  
486. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 182 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
487. Id. at 181 (“There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches of 
homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is 
made, about which courts do nothing, and about which we never hear.”). 
488. Larry Glasser, The American Exclusionary Rule Debate: Looking to England and Canada for 
Guidance, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 159, 191 (2003) (explaining that citizens only have a 
“minimal” chance to recover civilly for violations of their Fourth Amendment rights because juries 
are overwhelmingly biased and unsympathetic towards those involved in criminal conduct). 
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CONCLUSION 
Every police investigative action that implicates Fourth Amendment 
protections requires separate and individualized probable cause. The 
presence of probable cause in the context of the automobile exception, 
whether generated by an officer or a drug-detection dog, authorizes just 
one thing: a vehicle search.489 Justice Sotomayor best summarized the 
constitutional scope of the automobile exception in her Collins majority 
opinion, writing, “its name alone should make all this clear enough: It is, 
after all, an exception for automobiles.”490 
But lower courts are expanding the probable cause associated with the 
automobile exception to justify the search or arrest of vehicle occupants. 
These courts authorize almost any warrantless investigative technique 
during a traffic stop so long as officers have “probable cause.” In doing 
so, they fail to distinguish whether that probable cause supports a search 
or seizure, leading to reliance on inapplicable search warrant exceptions 
like exigent circumstances or search incident to arrest. Those approaches 
create an unconstitutional collage of warrantless investigative techniques 
by deviating from the automobile exception and misapplying the probable 
cause standard. 
Relatedly, as the application of the automobile exception expands, so 
too does the application of probable cause more generally. Viewed in that 
context, then, the automobile exception is merely one symptom of a much 
larger constitutional issue—the expansion of probable cause—that 
permits the careless expansion of other exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. But as the Nebraska Supreme Court has aptly recognized, 
“[p]robable cause to arrest is not some vapor permeating a place, 
engulfing anyone who happens to be at a site where unlawful conduct may 
be occurring or may have occurred.”491 
In Earnest Hemmingway’s 1926 novel, The Sun Also Rises, one man 
asks another, “how did you go bankrupt?”492 The other man replied, “Two 
 
489. The Georgia Supreme Court has also succinctly summarized the scope of the automobile 
exception:  
[T]he automobile exception cases do not hold that a search warrant is never needed to search a 
car. There is an automobile exception to the search warrant requirement, not an exemption. 
Otherwise, the Supreme Court of the United States would have held that the police would not, 
under any circumstances, need to obtain a search warrant for an automobile, provided they have 
probable cause for the search.  
State v. LeJeune, 576 S.E.2d 888, 892 (Ga. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
490. Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1673 (2018). 
491. State v. Evans, 389 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Neb. 1986) (“[P]robable cause to arrest is particularized 
and exists in reference to a specific individual.”). 
492. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE SUN ALSO RISES 141 (1926). 
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ways: gradually and then suddenly.”493 The idea is that the world is full of 
thresholds; those that are often approached without warning and have dire 
consequences once reached. Applied to this Article, every small deviation 
from constitutional standards does not seem like a cause for alarm on its 
own. But somewhere there exists a threshold. Wherever it is, we have 
passed it—as demonstrated by the countless illustrations of lower court 




493. Id.  
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